242 ANNUAL REPORT SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, 1960 



the harmonization of such things as light, X-rays, wireless radiations, 

 and so forth. 



And as science advanced, particularly in the atomic realm, it became 

 evident that the theoretical procedures born of astronomy were becom- 

 ing increasingly unsuccessful in providing a description of all that 

 happened. It became evident that the procedure which was likely to 

 work was a procedure in which one concentrated more on inquiring as 

 to the patterns which can exist in nature, patterns of motions of par- 

 ticles, in the first instance, and later, patterns of more abstract things 

 which the physicist called "psi functions." The old laws of motion of 

 particles formerly occupied the central stage of our interest. Any 

 pattern to which they led could be regarded as permissible ; and of the 

 permissible patterns, there was an infinite variety. In the new era of 

 atomic philosophy what remained of the old laws of motions of things 

 was relegated to the service of limiting the patterns which could occur. 

 The fundamental duty of these old laws, as dressed in their new garb, 

 was to declare as meaningless all patterns but a limited set, the set 

 which could be evolved out of them. The fundamental bricks of 

 nature's structure were patterns which, bom of these laws, dictated the 

 things which could occur as distinct from those which could not occur. 



The bricks of nature — the atoms, the molecules — were, in principle, 

 more like a set of oriental rugs than minute astronomical systems. 

 These rugs, indeed, were only symbolic and with them there went a 

 scheme of interpretation of their significance. There is a faint analogy 

 between these rugs and the oriental rugs which adorn your houses, for 

 I believe it is a fact that the various patterns and subpatterns in these 

 rugs are created with interpretable meanings. 



And so, in science, what had formerly been laws of motions of par- 

 ticles were transformed to laws which determined what patterns could 

 exist in nature, and with this scheme of things there went a key for the 

 interpretation of the patterns. It was indeed, a far cry from one who 

 thought to understand these laws of patterns in the sense in which, 

 perhaps, he may have thought he understood the laws of astronomy. 

 If you ask a maker of oriental rugs in what sense he understands the 

 meaning of the rugs, he may rightly reply : "I do not have the problem 

 of understanding why these rugs exist. I and my forerunners created 

 the designs ourselves, but we have endeavored to weave into them a 

 symbolic meaning which reflects the relationships of things in the 

 world around us. Why these things should be and why that which 

 happens does happen, we know not. Our function is that of system- 

 atic catalogers of events, and our rugs are the symbolic catalogs." 



Now, I do not mean to say that the citizens of Arabia who make 

 rugs would say everything that I have put into tlieir moutlis if I 

 started with them a discussion on the matter. All I maintain is that 



