National Scientific and Educational Institutions. 327 



APPENDIX B. 



ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, BY BENJAMIN 



RUSH, M. D., 1787. 



[Reprinted from Nilcs's Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, pp. 234-236.] 



There is nothing more common, than to confound the terms of American Revolu- 

 tion with those of the late American ivar. The American war is over: but this is far 

 from being the case with the American revolution. On the contrary, nothing but 

 the first act of the great drama is closed. It remains yet to establish and perfect 

 our new forms of government; and to prepare the principles, morals, and manners 

 of our citizens, for the.se forms of government, after they are established and brovtght 

 to perfection. 



The confederation, together with most of our state constitutions, were formed 

 under very unfavorable circumstances. We had ju.st emerged from a corrupted 

 monarchy. Although we understood perfectly the principles of liberty, yet most of 

 us were ignorant of the forms and combinations of power in republics. Add to this, 

 the British army was in the heart of our country, spreading desolation wherever it 

 went: our resentments, of course, were awakened. We deserted the British name, 

 and unfortunately refused to copy some things in the administration of justice and 

 power, in the British government, which have made it the admiration and envy of 

 the world. In our opposition to monarchy, we forgot that the temple of tyranny has 

 two doors. We bolted one of them by proper restraints; but we left the other open, 

 by neglecting to guard against the effects of our own ignorance and licentiousness. 

 Most of the present difficulties of this country arise from the weakness and other 

 defects of oxu" governments. 



My business at present shall be only to suggest the defects of the confederation. 

 These consist — ist. In the deficiency of coercive power. 2d. In a defect of exclusive 

 power to issue paper money and regulate commerce. 3d. In vesting the sovereign 

 power of the United States in a single legislature: and, 4th. In the too frequent 

 rotation of its members. 



A convention is to sit soon for the purpose of devising means of obviating part of 

 the two first defects that have been mentioned. But I wish they may add to their 

 recommendations to each state, to surrender up to congress their power of emitting 

 money. In this way, a uniform currency will be produced, that will facilitate trade, 

 and help to bind the states together. Nor will the states be deprived of large sums 

 of money by this means, when sudden emergencies require it; for they may always 

 borrow them, as they did during the war, out of the treasury of congress. Even a 

 loan office may be better instituted in this way, in each state than in any other. 



The two last defects that have been mentioned, are not of less magnitude than the 

 first. Indeed, the single legislature of congress will become more dangerous, from 

 an increase of power, than ever. To remedy this, let the supreme federal power be 

 divided, like the legislatures of most of our states, into two distinct, independent 

 branches. Let one of them be styled the council of the states and the other the 

 assembly of the states. Let the first consist of a single delegate — and the second, of 

 two, three, or four delegates, chosen annually by each state. Let the president 

 be chosen annually by the joint ballot of both houses; and let him possess certain 

 powers, in conjunction with a privy council, especially the power of appointing 

 most of the officers of the United States. The oflficers will not only be better, when 

 appointed this way, but one of the principal causes of faction will be thereby removed 

 from congress. I apprehend this division of the power of congress will become more 

 necessary, as soon as they are invested with more ample powers of levying and 

 expending public money. 



