CONDORCET: A BIOGRAPHY. 187 



stituted so that tbe innocent may run very little risk of condemnation ; 

 in order also to comprehend that the chances of an unjust condemna- 

 tion will be as much les-sened as the judgment is rendered by the greater 

 majority, the simple natural light of the most ordinary sentiments of 

 humanity is all that is necessary. The problem becomes much more 

 complicated when the question is to reconcile the proper guaranty of 

 justice to the innocent with the need of society that the guilty shall 

 not escape ; simple reason here gives only vague results, to these cal- 

 culation alone can give precision. 



Let me repeat, that injudicial decisions there are certain phases, cer- 

 tain points of view, where resort may be had to calculation. By carrying 

 into this labyrinth the torch of mathematical analysis, Condorcet not 

 only proved his own courage, but oi^ened an entirely new path. This, 

 if pursued by geometers with a firm but cautious step, should lead 

 to the discovery, in the social, judicial, and political organization of 

 modern societies, of anomalies hitherto unsuspected. 



It is quite evident that in its incursions into the domain of jurispru- 

 dence, the calculus of probabilities has for its object solely the numeri- 

 cal comparison of the decisions obtained with such or such a majority; 

 to find the relative value of such or such number of witnesses. I may 

 then in terms of severe reproof direct the attention of the public to the 

 passages La Harpe, in his FhilosopMe du XVIII Steele, has devoted to 

 these applications of mathematics. It will be seen there, I dare say, 

 with astonishment that the writer accuses our colleague of wishing to do 

 away with testimony, aud even written i)roof ; of pretending to replace 

 these advantageously by analytical formulae. Instead of desiring to 

 refute expressions so far from academical as "this is a supremely ridicu- 

 lous useot science," it is "an extravagant conquesu of the revolutionary 

 philosophy," "this shows what insanity mathematics may produce," one 

 regrets to see a man of real talent fallen into such incredible errors. As 

 to tlie rest, it is a new proof that no one, not even an academician, can 

 safely speak of that which he has not studied. 



I must confess that the mathematical writings of Condorcet lack the 

 elegant clearness which distinguish in so high a degree the memoirs 

 of Euler and of Lagrange. D'Alembert, who was himself not irre- 

 ])roachable in this respect, endeavored, but with no great success, to 

 induce our former secretary to take more pains. In March, 1772, he 

 wrote to Lagrange: " I wish much that our friend Condorcet, who has 

 so much sagacity, and such genius, had a better manner of expression, 

 but it seems to be the nature of his mind to work in this way." This ex- 

 cuse for him has more ibundation than might readily be accepted. 

 Euler, d'Alembert, Lagrange, with an equal talent for mathematics, had 

 each entirely different modes of working. Euler calculated without 

 apparent effort, as men breathe, as the birds fly. In a letter I have 

 under my eyes, dated 17G9, d'Alembert thus speaks of himself to 

 Lagrange : " It is not in my nature to occupy myself with one thing 



