426 ANNUAL REPORT SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, 194 7 



Any one of these sea-level routes thus might require up to 2,000 

 million yards of excavation. It is also pertinent to note that they are 

 in isolated locations without terminal ports or harbors, and that the 

 construction problems to be met are uncertain, and difficult to appraise. 

 On the credit side any one of them would provide a route supple- 

 mentary to the present canal, not only far removed from it, but devoid 

 of locks, so that requirements of both security and capacity could be 

 satisfied. It would seem that cost and construction difficulties relative 

 to the other routes — and perhaps political considerations — would be 

 the determinants in deciding whether one of these three crossings would 

 be recommended. 



The Nicaragua lock canal has many advantageous aspects. Topo- 

 graphical and geological conditions of the route are well defined. 

 Excavation would be less than for a sea-level canal. On the basis of 

 the 1931 cost estimates, the present cost might be fixed in the neighbor- 

 hood of 1% billion dollars. Political considerations are favorable 

 since the Nicaraguan Government has offered complete cooperation. 

 From the standpoint of dispersion, canals in Nicaragua and Panama 

 would satisfy security to the degree that a lock canal can be considered 

 secure ; or, stated in another way, to the degree that they increase the 

 difficulty of an enemy to deprive us of a trans-isthmian crossing. This 

 latter consideration is the one to be resolved in deciding for or against 

 recommending the Nicaraguan route. 



The Chorerra routes in Panama offer the possibility of a sea-level 

 canal with a minimum of wet excavation. Topographical and geo- 

 logical conditions are reasonably well known, which may or may not 

 be an advantage since they presage expensive harbor and port facilities 

 and total excavation of over 1% billion cubic yards. A distinct dis- 

 advantage is that their construction would require an enlargement of 

 the Canal Zone and removal of one or both terminals from the vicinity 

 of existing Panamanian cities. 



The Panama Parallel Eout-e would permit a sea-level canal to be built 

 in the Zone without disturbing the present lock canal. By its construc- 

 tion we would have two canals, although their proximity one to the 

 other would raise the question of complete wartime safety. Construc- 

 tion could be done in the dry, but the building of the barrier dams 

 required to hold back Gatun Lake would be a task of gi-eat magnitude, 

 while their breaching in case of attack might put both canals out of 

 service. Relative cost and security from attack are the factors to be 

 considered in choosing this interesting scheme. 



Converting the present canal to sea level will entail less total exca- 

 vation than on any other sea-level route and probably no more than 

 for a lock canal in Nicaragua. Terminal facilities are established and 

 thus do not enter into the future costs. On the other hand, the neces- 



