3 • [ I ] 



It is provided in the first section of this act, " That at every session of 

 Congress, and every meeting of the Senate in the recess of Congress, after 

 the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, each 

 Senator shall be entitled to receive eight dollars for every day he has at- 

 tended or shall attend the Senate, and shall also be allowed eight dollars 

 for every twenty miles of estimated distance, by the most usual road from 

 his place of residence to the seat of Congress, at the commencement and 

 end of every such session and meeting ; and that all sums for travel already 

 performed, to be due and payable at the time of passing this act." 



It must be conceded that your mileage at this session, is governed by 

 this act, unless the proviso before quoted should be ruled to apply. In 

 my judgment that proviso has no application beyond the session of 1849-50, 

 for the following reasons ; 



The proviso is attached to " the act to supply a deficiency in the appro- 

 priation for pay and mileage of members of Congress for the present ses- 

 sion." The first section of that act are in these words: 



" That the sum of one hundred and sixty thousand dollars be, and the 

 same is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not other- 

 wise appropriated, for the payment of mileage and per diem of Senators, 

 niembers of the House of Representatives and delegates in Congress at the 

 present session ; two thousand three hundred and thirty dollars for addi- 

 tional expense for stationary for members of the House of Representatives 

 during the present session ; Provided, That the mileage of the Senators 

 and Representatives from California and the delegate from Oregon, be 

 c&mputed according to the most usual travelling route within the limits 

 of the United States ; and the per diem of said Senators and Represen- 

 tatives for this session, shall commence for the day on which the Consti- 

 tution of California was first communicated to the two houses of Congress 

 respectively." 



It will be perceived, that the operation of the law is limited in the body 

 of the act as well as in the title to " the present session." The act then 

 being confined in its very terms to the last session, the proviso to that act 

 can only have an operation in point of time co-extensive wnth that of the 

 law itself. This is the general and well established rule in the construc- 

 tion of statutes, that if the operation of an act is limited therein to a spe- 

 cified period, a proviso to that act must have a similar limitation, unless 

 it is otherwise expressly declared in the proviso. 



This general rule of construction applies still more strongly to the an- 

 nual appropriation laws of Congress, and with irresistible force to all an- 

 nual appro])riations for deficiencies. If, however, any doubt could remain 

 as regards this question, it must be removed, on reference to the decision 

 of the Supreme court of the United States, in the case of Minis versus the 

 United States, (15 Peters, 423.) 



In that case, the question was, whether a proviso to an annual appro- 

 priation bill of Congress w^as permanent in its o])eration, or expired with 

 the termination of the year for which the appropriation was made. It was 

 the unanimous o})inion of the court that the effect of the proviso was tem- 

 porary, and commensurate only as to time with the operation of the law. 



The views of the court on this point are given at })ages 445-6-7, and 

 would seem to he conclusive. The court say " the argument on behalf 

 "of the United States is, that this proviso although found in a mere appro- 

 "priation law of a limited nature, is to be construed by reason of the words 



