1917] on Some Guarantees of Liberty . lOS 



individual in the community, together with his preservation as an 

 efficient unit in the community, and the preservation of the freedom 

 and independence of the community as an efficient unit in the society 

 of free nations. 



The war has rendered us no greater service than that of remind- 

 ing us that individual freedom is contingent upon the preservation 

 of the independence of the community. It has taught us that 

 individual liberties preserved or acquired during centuries of political 

 struggle mast be surrendered when the life of the community is at 

 stake. Save among small minorities of extreme pacifists and " con- 

 scientious objectors," this truth is to-day unchallenged. It is, 

 moreover, sound liberal doctrine. John Stuart Mill recognized it 

 in the Introduction to his essay on " Liberty," " There are also," he 

 wrote, " many positive acts for the benefit of others which he (the 

 individual) may rightfully be compelled to perform ; such as to give 

 evidence in a court of justice ; to bear his fair share in the common 

 defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the 

 society of which he enjoys the protection ; and to peform certain 

 acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's life, 

 or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things 

 which, whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may right- 

 fully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may 

 cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and 

 in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The 

 latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of 

 compulsion than the former. To make anyone answerable for not 

 preventing evil is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there 

 are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that 

 exception." 



This doctrine Mill held to be entirely compatible with the 

 maintenance of " absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all 

 subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or theological." 

 War for the defence of the community, or preparation for the 

 eventual defence of the community, are certainly contingencies 

 " clear enough and grave enough " to justify compulsion ; and the 

 application of compulsion cannot in these cases be held an infraction 

 of the rightful freedom of the individual. 



The fundamental characteristic of a liberal conception of freedom 

 is that it regards compulsory interference with the life and conduct 

 of individuals as the exception, not as the rule ; and looks upon 

 them rather as necessary qualifications of a general principle than as 

 ends in themselves. Since the applications of compulsion and the 

 restrictions of individual liberty have to be carried out by the 

 representative organs of the community — that is to say, by the State 

 — it is evident that the liberal conception of freedom implies a 

 liberal conception of the nature and of the functions of the State 

 itself. 



