SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY. 9 



only kind of thought that is not based upon feeling. What I say, 

 then, is that it is imperative that every man should definitely 

 determine his intellectual starting-point ; and my object is briefly 

 to try to show that the intellect need not launch into scientific 

 research, as some compassless barque upon a heaving and restless 

 sea, but that it is able to discover to itself the range of its responsi- 

 bility, within the boundary line that separates the alone apprehensible 

 from that which may be comprehended, — and to do so never more 

 surely than when in contemplation of its work. Let us first be 

 severe in our treatment of ourselves, and make up our minds to 

 throw, or be thrown, upon the strictly intellectual ground. We need 

 not fear being landed in any fog ; if we do, we must alter our 

 definition of the phrase, " scientific research." Conscious liabiUty 

 to fog must always engender subtle suspicion of the correctness of 

 such of our conclusions as may suggest the question, " Why ? " 

 An honest intellect, then, must proceed on one of two assurances, 

 either that there has, or has not, been a first cause, and that there 

 is, or is not, a sustaining and governing agent. The only other 

 course open, is to take refuge in the view that our intelligence is 

 limited, and can never of itself come to a decision upon this point. 

 Darwin's letter shows that he resorted to this course. He is 

 almost dogmatic in the matter of intellectual limit. 



Now, before referring to the alternative question, let me 

 submit two or three propositions to show that such a position as 

 this last is untenable. It supplies the material for its own over- 

 throw. What is a limit ? An imposition. A limit is therefore a 

 creature. A creature pre-supposes a creator, for a creature and its 

 creator cannot be one and the same existence, until a thing 

 can be, and cannot be, in the same sense, and at one and the same 

 moment of time. A creator, then, is in the nature of things 

 distinct from its creation. But the first limit was a creature. Its 

 creator, therefore, is inimitable,— and that, at least, in the attri- 

 butes oi power and duration, called into exercise in the creative 

 act. 



The question now remains, " Does the intellectual method 

 lead us to the straightforward assertion that there has been no 

 first cause, nor a sustaining and governing agent, — in other 

 words, that there has not been, neither is, a God ? " Without 



