National Scientific and Ed neat ion a/ Institutions. 327 



APPENDIX B. 



ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, BY BENJAMIN 



RUSH, M. D., 1787. ' 



[Reprinted from Niles's Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, pp. 234-236.] 



There is nothing more conmKMi, than to confound the terms of American Revolu- 

 tion Avith those of tlie late American 7car. The American war is over: but this is far 

 from 1)eing the case with the American revolution. On the contrary, nothing but 

 the first act of the great drama is closed. It remains }et to establish and perfect 

 our new fomis of government; and to prepare the principles, morals, and manners 

 of our citizens, for the.se forms of government, after they are established and brotight 

 to perfection. 



The confederation, together with most of our state constitutions, were formed 

 under very unfavorable circumstances. We had just emerged from a corrupted 

 monarch}-. Although we understood perfectly the principles of liberty, yet most of 

 us were ignorant of the forms and combinations of power in republics. Add to this, 

 the British army was in the heart of our country, .spreading desolation wherever it 

 went: our resentments, of course, were awakened. We deserted the British name, 

 and unfortunatel}- reftised to copy .some things in the administration of justice and 

 power, in the British government, which have made it the admiration and envy of 

 the world. In otir opposition to monarchy, we forgot that the temple of tyranny has 

 two doors. We bolted one of them bj^ proper restraints; but we left the other open, 

 by neglecting to guard against the eflfects of our own ignorance and licentiousness. 

 ]Most of the present diflfictilties of this cotmtry arise from the weakness and other 

 defects of our governments. 



My business at present .shall be only to suggest the defects of the confederation. 

 These consi.st — ist. In the deficiency of coercive power. 2d. In a defect of exclusive 

 power to i.ssue paper money and regulate commerce. 3d. Investing the .sovereign 

 power of the United vStates in a single legislature: and, 4th. In the too frecjuent 

 rotation of its members. 



A convention is to sit .soon for the purpose of devising means of obviating part of 

 the two first defects that have been mentioned. But I wi.sh thej' may add to their 

 recommendations to each state, to surrender up to congress their power of emitting 

 money. In this way, a uniform currency will be produced, that will facilitate trade, 

 and help to l)ind the states together. Nor will the states be deprived of large .sums 

 of money by this means, when sudden emergencies require it; for they may always 

 l)orrow them, as they did dtiring the war, out of the treasury of congress. Even a 

 loan office may be better instituted in this way, in each state than in any other. 



The two la.st defects that have been mentioned, are not of less magnitude than the 

 first. Indeed, the single legislattire of congress will become more dangerous, from 

 an increase of jiower, than ever. To remedy this, let the stipreme federal power be 

 divided, like the legislatures of most of our .states, into two distinct, independent 

 branches. I^et one of them be .styled the council of the states and the other the 

 assembly of the states. Let the fir.st con.si.st of a single delegate — and the .second, of 

 two, three, or four delegates, cho.sen annually by each state. Let the pre.sident 

 be chosen annually by the joint ballot of both hou.ses; and let him possess certain 

 ])owers, in conjunction with a privy council, especially the power of appointing 

 mo.st of the officers of the United vStatcs. The officers will not only be better, when 

 appointed this way, but one of the principal causes of faction will be thereby removed 

 from congress. I apprehend this division of the power of congress will become more 

 nece.s.sary, as .soon as they are invested with more ample powers of levying and 

 expending public money. 



