THE SUBMARINE BOAT. 719 



boats, and considerable weight has been given to their opinion by rea- 

 son of the myster}^ which has been ascribed to the construction and 

 operation of the craft. Any tactical value that the boats ma}' possess 

 will be dependent upon the speed when running upon the surface or 

 submerged, the ability to maneuver, the power to find the enemy, 

 the facilities for discharging and taking on board a torpedo, and the 

 radius of action when submerged. These factors will be dependent 

 upon the structural arrangement of the boat and the character of the 

 auxiliaries installed, and therefore any mystery surrounding the boat 

 would be very short lived. 



TIME AND EXPERIENCE MAY DEVELOP AX EFFICIENT CRAFT. 



The naval battles of the future will ])e won by the nation which has 

 made preparation for a conflict, and which has supplied itself with 

 every possible weapon of war. Although an implement may not do 

 all that it was designed to perform, yet it is possible that by develop- 

 ment its capabilities may be increased to an extent that was not orig- 

 inally deemed probable. Man}' experts are doubtful as to the value 

 of ordinary surface torpedo boats, and yet as long as rivals possess 

 them, no nation would think of dispensing with this form of con- 

 struction. We can anticipate the same experience with the subma- 

 rine. As few things are impossible, the submarine may be developed 

 in time to a state of efficiency and reliability that will cause a revolu- 

 tion in the composition of fleets. Such a result, however, can only 

 be brought about by encouraging competition. Every individual 

 inventor who has made a distinct advance in improving the efficiency 

 of the submarine should be substantially rewarded. Under no cir- 

 cumstances should the opinion be permitted to prevail that any one 

 design of boat is an accomplished fact, and that no further develop- 

 ment is possible. 



NO NATION CAN RETAIN A MONOPOLY OF PERFECTED DESIGN. 



As the several naval powers are seeking new weapons of war, it 

 will not be possible to prevent the use of any appliance that has a 

 military value. Neither conservative officials nor national jealousy 

 could stand in the way of the adoption of any appliance that could be 

 used for oflfensive and defensive work by military or naval authorities. 

 In the struggle for naval supremacy, the inventive genius of the 

 American, the practical experience of the English, the application 

 of the Russian, the exact science of the French, and the profound- 

 thought of the German are being exercised. The desire and passion 

 for militarv strength is so great upon the part of all powers, that 

 there is no hesitancy, upon the part of any, to copy from the other 

 any plan or jirocess which makes for increased military efficiency or 

 wider field of action. 



