THE SUBMAKINE BOAT. 733 



The test should be a veiy complete one. Each company might pre- 

 scribe conditions for the other to meet. The Na^ y Department should 

 finally demand requirements that would show whether or not the boat 

 was a useful weapon of war. 



COMPETITION WOULD ADVANCE RATHER THAN DELAY CONSTRUCTION. 



The policy of competition would not make for delay in submarine- 

 boat construction. It would advance the number and efficiency of the 

 craft that we shall possess within the next live vears. It will prevent 

 the Navy being exclusively saddled with the design of an inferior type. 

 It will stimulate invention along this line. It w ill not only prove to 

 the officers of the service, but to individual inventors, that the Nav}^ is 

 not wedded to the belief that technical skill in this line is possessed by 

 few persons. It will compel those securing one contract to keep 

 abreast of the times by making progressive improvements. If ^-ou 

 have such competition, you will absolutely discover the character and 

 efficiency of this type of naval construction, and for this reason, if no 

 other, such a policv should be pursued. 



Such a policy should be pursued because it is founded upon patriot- 

 ism and conunon sense. It may interfere with the purse and prestige 

 of individuals, but such individuals can ali'ord to sacrifice something 

 to increase the efficiency of the Navy, particularly if for a time they 

 have had an opportunity to fatten themselves at the public crib. 



The builders of these boats may be verv sincere as to the efficienc}'' 

 of their respective types, but of necessity such people must give 

 ex parte testimony. The Department should, therefore, be sustained 

 in its contention that performances and not promises should be the 

 factors in determining the advisability of extensively entering into 

 this form, of construction. 



SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOWN THE HOLLAND COMPANY. 



The Holland Company has been special h' favored. The first boat 

 that this company attempted to build was the Phnujtr. This construc- 

 tion was a Government contract. The Navy Department expended 

 about $90,000 in partial payment before it was evident to the con- 

 tractors that the boat could not meet official requirements. The 

 compan}' advanced but comparatively little mone}' in taking that con- 

 tract. Then the IloUdiid was built by the company with its own 

 funds. This was an enterprising performance; but it must be remem- 

 bered that the company was $90,000 in debt to the Government, and 

 therefore further risks were taken to protect the interests and sustain 

 the prestige of the company. Afterwards six additional boats were 

 authorized by Congress at a cost of $170,000 each, the same price that 

 was paid for the Holland. The Chief Constructor of the Navj^ has testi- 

 fied that a proper cost of building these boats exclusive of the use of the 

 patents (to which he attaches very little value) will be about $90,000. 



