EULOGY ON THE LATE GENERAL JOSEPH G. TOTTEN. 147 



" 2d. As from the nature of the case there can be no reason for expecting an 

 attack on one of these points rather than on another, and no time for transfer- 

 ring our state of preparation from one to another alter an attack has been de- 

 clared, each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means ; and, 



" 3d. Consequently this system demands a power in the defence as many 

 times greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered. 



" There has been but one practice among nations as to the defence of poits 

 and harbors, and that has been a resort to fortifications. All the experience 

 that history exhibits is on one side only ; it is the opposition of forts or other 

 works, comprehended by the term fortification, to attack by vessels, and al- 

 though history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, v/e 

 gee that the resort is still the same. No nation omits covering the exposed 

 points upon her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates in confiding in them. " 



The most prominent cases of such successful attacks, viz. Copenhagen, Al- 

 giers, San Juan de Ulloa, &c., iare then described and discussed, to show that 

 the deductions drawn from them are erroneous, or that they are not cases in 

 point, or that the disastrous result has been owing to the neglected condition, 

 imperfect armament, or unskilful and inadequate defence of the forts. 



The report, of Avhich I have given some of the main points, may be said to 

 have silenced opposition to our system of fortifications for the next ten years ; 

 but, in a form modified by the alleged changes in the condition of the country, 

 increase of population, construction of railroads, &c., it again found expression 

 in a resolution of Congress in 1851; and the Secretary of War, to enable him- 

 self to respond, called upon numerous distinguished army and navy officers for 

 an expression of their opinions. The following questions were addressed to sev- 

 eral of the principal engineer officers, among whom the chief of corps, General 

 Totten : 



" 1st. How far the invention and extension of railroads have superseded or 

 diminished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard ? 



" 2d. In what manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by 

 steam, and particularly the application of steam to vessels of war, and recent 

 improvements in artillery, and other military inventions and discoveries, affect 

 this question 1 



" 3d. How far vessels of war, steam batteries, ordinary merchant ships and 

 steamers, and other temporary expedients, can be relied upon as a substitute 

 for permanent fortifications for the defence of our seaports? 



" 4th. How far the increase of population on the northern frontier and of the 

 mercantile marine on the northern lakes obviates or diminishes the necessity of 

 continuing the system of fortifications on these lakes ]" 



General Totten's response to these critical interrogations is, as usual vv'ith 

 him when this great subject has to be dealt with, full and exhaustive. The 

 following piihy paragraphs exhibit his views on the influence of railroads : 



'' Suppose a hostile fleet to lie in front of the city of New York — which 

 nothing would prevent, if the channels of approach were not fortified — in what 

 way could the 100,000 or 200,000 new men poured into the city and environs 

 by railroads, although armed with muskets and field-pieces, aid the half-million. 

 of people already there '/ It seems to me very clear that these additional forces 

 would, like the population of the city, be utterly powerless in the way of resist- 

 ance, with any means at their command, and, if resistance were attempted by 

 the city, would but serve to swell the list of casualties, unless they should at 

 once retreat beyoird the range of fire. If the enemy's expedition were intended, 

 according to the second supposed mode of attack, for invasion, or occupation for 

 some time, of a portion of the country, then in many places this resource of 

 railroads would be of value, because then the duty of defence would fall upon 

 the army and militia of the country, and these communications would swell 

 their numbers. 



