EULOGY ON THE LATE GENERAL JOSEPH G. TOTTEN. 155 



to speedy efficiency was vast ; embrasures and floors of casemates were to be 

 raised to compensate the settlement the work had undergone ; earth to be 

 removed from the arches, in order to repair or renew the roofing; magazines 

 and quarters to be refitted, and all this before a gun could be mounted in a 

 proper manner. On all these points Colonel Totten was rich in the experience 

 of his long researches, and ready at once to give the proper directions. Follow- 

 ing his detailed instructions, the works speedily reached such a condition of 

 efficiency as to permit the mounting and service of their guns.* 



What the writer here relates from his own experience at New Orleans serves 

 but to illustrate the indefatigable labors and personal agency of Colonel Totten 

 at this period, along the whole seaboard of the United States, in bringing all 

 its ports and harbors into a defensible condition. Nor should I confine these 

 attributes to any particular period. During the whole time of his chief cngi- 

 neershiii he continued the same laborious supervision. Generally once in about 

 every two years he inspected every fort of the United States, and scarcely 

 was the local engineer officer more thoroughly familiar with each detail of his 

 own particular works than was the Chief Engineer with those of all under charge 

 of the Engineer bureau. Besides attending to the routine duties of his office at 

 Washington, he found time to design plans for new works, as well as for altera- 

 tions or enlargement of old ones. An admirable draughtsman, executing his 

 work with a delicacy and finish that defied competition on the part of his sub- 

 ordinates, he would be usually found, if visited at his otHce, engaged at 

 his draA\'ing-table. Indeed, if he had a fault as Chief Engineer, it was the 

 habit of doing everything himself. It was contemplated by the Regulations 

 lations that all plans of fortifications should be made by a board of engineers, 

 and General Totten, in one of his reports, alludes to the fact that this has 

 not always been the case, in these woixls : " In rare cases it has happened that 

 plans have been made under the particular direction of the Chief Engineer, owing 

 to the difficulty, at moments, of drawing the widely dispersed members of the 

 board from their individual trusts." It may be said, too, injustice to him, that 

 when he assumed control of the bureau, it was almost indispensable to takte 

 much upon himself, in the direction of the repairs and prosecution of many of 

 the Avorks, owing to the great pressure thrown upon the corps by the circum- 

 stauces of the period, aud the want of a sufficient number of experienced 

 officers. 



The excitement produced by the anticipation of war with England was fol- 

 lowed by an actual war with a weak neighbor, a Avar inaugurated by the same 

 influences which, in a more potent form, produced the rebellion, or rather of 

 which the rebellion was but the legitimate and natural sequel. Called on by 

 General Scott, who reposed in his professional skill the most unbounded conii- 

 dence, Colonel Totten assumed, in 1847, the immediate control of the engineer- 

 ing operations of the army destined to invade the Mexican capital, directing in 

 this capacity the siege of Vera Cruz. For his successful services he was 

 breveted a brigadier general, March 29, 1S47, " for gallant and meritorious 

 conduct at the siege of Vera Cruz." Having thus successfully accomplished 

 the special task for which he had been selected, he left the army and resumed 

 Lis station at Washington. 



In addition to the onerous duties of his office, involving, besides the labors 

 described, the inspectorship and supervision of the Military Academy, his 

 position and high reputation subjected him to calls for incidental labors by the 

 government, by the States, or by municipal bodies. A few months prior to his 



* Wheu Forts Jackson and Philip, on the Mississippi, were attacked by the fleets of Com- 

 manders Farrawut and Porter, they were not provided witli the anuameats intended ior them, 

 and the garrisons were demoralized by a long bombardment. It is not in place to discuss 

 this subject here. 



