THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN. 459 



different. Here tradition manifests itself in an action performed by 



the individual. The more frequently this action is repeated, the more 

 firmly it will become established, and the less will be the conscious 

 equivalent accompanying- the action; so that customary actions which 

 are of very frequent repetition become entirely unconscious. Hand 

 in hand wjth this decrease of consciousness goes an increase in the 

 emotional value of the omission of such activities, and still more of 

 the performance of actions contrary to custom. A greater will power 

 is required to inhibit an action which had become well established; 

 and combined with this effort of the will power are feelings of intense 

 displeasure. 



This leads us to the third problem, which is closely associated with 

 the difference between the manifestation of the power of civilized man 

 and of primitive man to inhibit impulses. It is the question of choice 

 as dependent upon value. It is evident from the preceding remarks 

 that, on the whole, we value most highly what conforms to our pre- 

 vious actions. This does not imply that it must be identical with our 

 previous actions, but it must be on the line of development of our 

 previous actions. This is particularly true of ethical concepts. No 

 action can find the approval of a people which is fundamentally 

 opposed to its customs and traditions. Among ourselves it is consid- 

 ered proper and a matter of course to treat the old with respect, for 

 children to look after the welfare of their aged parents; and not to do 

 so would be considered base ingratitude. Among the Eskimo we find 

 an entirely different standard. It is required of children to kill their 

 parents when they have become so old as to be helpless and no longer 

 of any use to the family or to the community. It would be considered 

 a 1 (reach of filial duty not to kill the aged parent. Revolting though 

 this custom may seem to us, it is founded on an ethical law of the 

 Eskimo, which rests on the whole mass of traditional lore and custom. 



One of the best examples of this kind is found in the relation between 

 individuals belonging to different tribes. There are a number of primi- 

 tive hordes to whom every stranger not a member of the horde is an 

 enemy, and where it is right to damage the enemy to the best of one's 

 power and ability, and if possible to kill him. This custom is founded 

 largely on the idea of the solidarity of the horde, and of the feeling 

 that it is the duty of every member of the horde to destroy all possible 

 enemies. Therefore every person not a member of the horde must be 

 considered as belonging to a class entirely distinct from the members 

 of the horde, and is treated accordingly. We can trace the gradual 

 broadening of the feeling of fellowship during the advance of civiliza- 

 tion. The feeling of fellowship in the horde expands to the feeling of 

 unity of the tribe, to a recognition of bonds established by a neigh- 

 borhood of habitat, and further on to the feeling of fellowship among 

 members of nations. This seems to be the limit of the ethical concept 



