EULOGY ON THE LATE GENERAL JOSEPH G. TOTTEN. 271 



" If our navy be inferior to that of the enemy, it can afford, of course, unaided 

 by fortifications, but a feeble resistance, single ships being assailed by whole 

 fleets; if it be equal, or superior, having numerous points along an extended 

 frontier to protect, and being unable to concentrate, because ignorant of the 

 selected point of attack, every point must be simultaneously guarded : our sep- 

 arate squadrons may therefore be captured in detail by the concentrated fleet of 

 the attacking power. If we attempt to concentrate under an idea that a favorite 

 object of the enemy is foreseen, he will not fail to push his forces upon the places 

 thus left without protection. This mode of defence is liable to the further 

 objections of being exposed to fatal disasters, although not engaged with an 

 enemy, and of leaving the issue of conflict often to be determined by accident, 

 in spite of all the efforts of courage and skill. If it were attempted to improve 

 upon this mode by adding temporary batteries and field works, it would be found 

 that, besides being weak and inadequate from their nature, the most suitable 

 positions for these works must often be neglected, under a necessary condition of 

 the plan, that the ships themselves be defended ; otherwise, they must cither 

 take no part in the contest, or be destroyed by the superior adversary." 



It is hardly to be expected that a system affording so much room for discus- 

 sion, and by its importance inviting it, should, especially in this country, escape 

 adverse judgment. Military and naval men, congressmen, and even cabinet 

 officers, have assailed it, called in question the principles on which it is based, or 

 denied the judiciousness of their application. The forms and sources of assault 

 have been varied, but there has been really no great difference in the substance, 

 of which, perhaps, as good an expression as any maybe found in these dogmas, 

 forming the pith of a criticism from no less a source than the Secretary of War, 

 Mr. Cass, approved by the President, General Jackson : 



" 1st. That for the defence of the coast, the chief reliance should be on the 

 navy; 



" 2d. That in preference to fortifications, floating batteries should be intro- 

 duced wherever they can be used ; 



" 3d. That we are not in danger of large expeditions ; and, consequently, 

 "4th. That the system of the board of engineers comprises works which are 

 unnecessarily large for the purposes which they have to fulfil." 



Owing to these strictures, the House of Representatives, by resolutions of 

 April 9, 1840, called upon the War Department for a report of a full and con- 

 nected system of national defence. The duty was committed by the Secretary 

 of War to a board of officers of the army and navy, among whom was Colonel 

 Totten, and by whom the report was drawn up. It was entirely approved by 

 the Secretary of War, Mr. Poinsett, and is universally admitted to be one of the 

 most able and comprehensive expositions of the whole subject of sea-coast de- 

 fence extant, and a complete refutation of the objections made to our existing 

 system. The discussion of the first and principal proposition — that of defence 

 by the navy — is so interesting and instructive that, though long, I venture to 

 quote it : 



" The opinion that the navy is the true defence of the country is so accept- 

 able and popular, and is sustained by such high authority, that it demands a 

 careful examination. 



" Before going into this examination, we will premise that by the term 'navy ' 

 is here meant, we suppose, line-of battle ships, frigates, smaller sailing vessels, 

 and armed steamships, omitting vessels constructed for local uses merely, such 

 as floating batteries. 



" For the purpose of first considering this proposition in its simplest terms, 

 we will begin by supposing the nation to possess but a single seaport, and that 

 this is to be defended by a fleet alone. 



" By remaining constantly within this port, our fleet would be certain of meet- 

 ing the enemy, should he assail it. But if inferior to the enemy, there wodd 



