272 EULOGl ON THE LATE GENERAL JOSEPH G. TOTTEN. 



be no reason to look for a successful defence ; and as there would be no escape 

 for the defeated vessels, the presence of the fleet, instead of averting the issue, 

 would only render it the more calamitous. 



" Should our fleet be equal to the enemy's, the defence might be complete, 

 and it probably would be so. Still, hazard, some of the many mishaps liable to 

 attend contests of this nature, might decide against us ; and in that event, the 

 consequences would be even more disastrous than on the preceding supposition. 

 In this case the chances of victory to the two parties would be equal, but the con- 

 sequences very unequal. It might be the enemy's fate to lose his whole fleet, 

 but he could lose nothing more ; while we in a similar attempt would lose not 

 only the whole fleet, but also the object that the fleet was designed to protect. 



" If superior to the enemy, the defence of the port would in all respects be 

 complete. But instead of making an attack, the enemy would, in such case, 

 employ himself in cutting up our commerce on the ocean ; and nothing could be 

 done to protect this commerce without leaving the port in a condition to' be suc- 

 cessfully assailed. 



" In either of the above cases the fleet might await the enemy in front of the 

 harbor, instead of lying within. But no advantage is apparent from such 

 arrangement, and there would be superadded the risk of being injured by tem- 

 pests, and thereby being disqualified for the duty of defence, or of being driven 

 off the coast by gales of wind, thus for a time removing all opposition. 



" In the same cases also, especially when equal or superior to the enemy, our 

 fleet, depending on having correct and timely notice as to the position and state 

 of preparation of the enemy's forces, might think proper to meet him at the out- 

 let of his own port, or intercept him on his way, instead of awaiting him within 

 or off our own harbor. Here it must be noticed that the enemy, like ourselves, 

 is supposed to possess a single harbor only ; but, having protected it by other 

 means, that his navy is disposable for offensive operations. If it were attempted 

 thus to shut him within his own port, he, in any case but that of decided infe- 

 riority, would not hesitate to come out and risk a battle ; because, if defeated, he 

 could retire under shelter of his defences to refit ; and if successful, he could 

 proceed with a small portion of his force— even a single vessel would suffice — 

 to the capture of our port now defenceless, while, with the remainder, he would 

 follow up his advantage over our defeated vessels, not failing to pursue into 

 their harbor should they return thither. 



" Actual superiority on our part would keep the enemy from volunteering a 

 battle; but it would be indispensable that the superiority be steadily main- 

 tained, and that the superior fleet be constantly present. If driven off by tem- 

 pests, or absent from any other cause, the blockaded fleet would escape, when it 

 would be necessary for our fleet to fly back to • the defence of its own port. 

 Experience abundantly proves, moreover, that it is in vain to attempt to shut a 

 hostile squadron in port for any length of time. It seems, then, that whether 

 we defend by remaining at home, or by shutting the enemy's fleet within his 

 own harbor, actual superiority in vessels is indispensable to the security of our 

 own port. 



" With this superiority the defence will be complete, provided our fleet re- 

 mains within its harbor. But then all the commerce of the country upon the 

 ocean must be left to its fate ; and no attempt can be made to react offensively 

 against the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleet 

 within his port, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the 

 escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor. Let 

 us next see what will be the state of the question on the supposition of numer 

 ous important ports on cither side, instead of a single one, relying on our part 

 still exclusively on a navy. 



"In order to examine this question, we will suppose our adversarv to be for- 

 tified in all his harbors, and possessed of available naval means, equal to our 



