EULOGY ON THE LATE GENERAL JOSEPH. G. TOTTEN. 273 



own. This is certainly a fair supposition ; because what is assumed as regards 

 his harbors is true of all maritime nations, except the United States ; and as re- 

 gards naval means, it is elevating our own strength considerably above its pres- 

 ent measure, and above that it is likely to attain for years. 



"Being thus relatively situated, the first difference that strikes us is, that the 

 enemy, believing all his ports to be safe without the presence of his vessels, sets 

 himself at once about making our seas and shores the theatre of operations, 

 while we are lefc without choice in the matter; for if he thinks proper to come, 

 and we are not present, he attains his object without resistance. 



" The next difference is, that while the enemy (saving only the opposition of 

 Providence) is certain to fall upon the single point, or the many points he may 

 have selected, there will exist no previous indications of his particular choice, 

 and, consequently, no reason for preparing our defence' on one point rather than 

 another; so that the chances of not being present and ready on his arrival are 

 directly in proportion to the number of our ports — that is to say, the greater the 

 number of ports, the greater the number of chances that he will meet no opposi 

 tion whatever. 



"Another difference is, that the enemy can choose the mode of warfare as 

 well as the plan of operations, leaving as little option to us in the one case as in 

 the other. It will be necessary for us to act, in the first instance, on the suppo- 

 sition that an assault will be made with his entire fleet ; because, should wo act 

 otherwise, his coming in that array would involve both fleet and coast in inev- 

 itable defeat and ruin. Being in this state of concentration, then, should the 

 enemy have any apprehensions about the result of a general engagement, should 

 he be unwilling to put anything at hazard, or should he, for any other reason, 

 prefer acting by detachments, he can, on approaching the coast, disperse his 

 force into small squadrons and single ships, and make simultaneous attacks on 

 numerous points. These enterprises would be speed. ly consummated, because, 

 as the single point occupied by our fleet would be avoided, all the detachments 

 would be unopposed; and after a few hours devoted to burning shipping, or 

 public establishments, and taking in spoil, the several expeditions would leave 

 the coast for some convenient rendezvous, whence they might return, either in 

 fleet or in detachments, to visit other portions with the scourge. 



" Is it insisted that our fleet might, notwithstanding, be so arranged as to 

 meet these enterprises 1 



" As it cannot be denied that the enemy may select his point of attack out of 

 the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot ? 

 And if it cannot be foretold, how i3 that ubiquity to be imparted that shall 

 always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe 1 Suppose we attempt 

 to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall wc sweep its whole length ? 

 — a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing 

 from his coast to ours. Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept as well as the 

 Atlantic ; or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy '( Shall we cover the 

 southern cities, or give them up also ? We must unquestionably do one of 

 two things : either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a 

 small portion only, or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy 

 would seem to be out of the question. " 



The report then goes on to discuss the uses for defensive purposes of gun- 

 boats, floating batteries and steam batteries, as distinguished from the navy 

 proper. Admitting their usefulness, and, even in some cases, their necessity, it 

 argues with great force that they arc not a substitute for and cannot supersede 

 fortifications, and it sums up its argument concerning naval defence with the 

 following broad propositions, to which it challenges opposition : 



" 1st. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the de- 

 fensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal 

 in -power to the attacking force. 

 18 



