EULOGY ON THE LATE GENEKAL JOSEPH G. TOTTEN 275 



" But of all circumstances of danger to the coast, this chance of an attempt 

 by an enemy to land and march any distance into a populous district is least to 

 be regarded, whether there be or be not such speedy mode of receiving re-en- 

 forcements, and our system of fortifications has little to do with any such dan- 

 ger. In preparing against maritime assaults, the security of the points to be 

 covered is considered to be greatly augmented whenever the defence can be so 

 arrauged as to oblige an enemy to land at some distance; for the reason that 

 opportunity is thereby allowed, in the only possible way, for the spirit and 

 enterprise of the people to come into play. 



"Instead of being designed to prevent a landing upon any part of the coast, 

 as many seem to suppose, and some allege in proof of extravagant views on the 

 part of the system of defence, the system often leaves this landing as an open 

 alternative to the enemy, and aims so to cover the really important and dan 

 gerous points as to necessitate a distant landing and a march towards the object 

 through the people. It is because the expedition would easily accomplish its 

 object without landing, and without allowing the population to partake in the 

 defence, that the fortifications are resorted to. For instance, without Fort Del- 

 aware, or some other fort low down on Delaware bay, an enemy could place 

 his fleet of steamers in front of Philadelphia by the time his appearance on the 

 coast had been well announced throughout the city. And in spite of all New 

 Jersey, Delaware, and lower Pennsylvania, he could levy his contributions, and 

 burn the navy yard and shipping, and be away, in a few hours. But being 

 obliged, by the fort above mentioned, to land full forty miles below the city, 

 the resistance to his march may be safely left to the courage and patriotism that 

 will find ample time to array themselves in opposition. " 



Concerning the application of steam to vessels of war he says : 



" The application of steam to vessels of war acts upon the question of sea- 

 coast defence both beneficially and injuriously. It acts injuriously in several 

 ways ; but chiefly, first, by the suddenness and surprise with which vessels may 

 fall upon their object, and pass from one object to another, in spite of distance, 

 climate, and season ; and, secondly, by their ability to navigate shallow waters. 



"The first property, by which squadrons may run into our harbors, out- 

 stripping all warnings of their approach, affords no chance for impromptu prepa- 

 rations; accordingly, whatever our preparations are to be, they should precede 

 the war. If seems past all belief that a nation having in commission — as 

 France and England always have — a large number of war-steamers, ready for 

 distant servicein twenty-four hours, receiving their orders by telegraph, capable 

 of uniting iii squadrons, and in two or three days at most speeding on their sev- 

 eral paths to fall upon undefended ports — it is not to be expected, I say, that 

 they should delay such enterprises until temporary resorts could be got ready 

 to receive them. And yet there are those who insist that we should leave 

 defensive measures to a state of war — that we should let the day supply the 

 need! 



" Inadequate as all such measures must prove, there would not be time to 

 arrange even these. By the second property, due to their light draught of water, 

 these vessels will oblige the defence to be extended in some form to passages 

 or channels or shoals that were before adequately guarded by their shallowness. 

 The bars at the mouth of the Mississippi formerly excluded all but small ves- 

 sels-of-war, and the strong current of the river made the ascent of sailing ves- 

 sels exceedingly uncertain and tedious. Now these bars and currents are imped- 

 iments no longer ; and all the armed steamers of Great Britain and France 

 might be formed in array in face of the city of New Orleans before a rumor of 

 their approach had been heard. 



" Had the English expedition of 1S14, attended by a squadron of armed 

 steamers, arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi, a few transports might have 

 been taken in tow, and in a few hours the whole army would have been before 



