276 EULOGY ON THE LATE GENERAL JOSEPH G. TOTTEN. 



the city. Or twelve or fifteen such steamers could have carried the whole army 

 up in half a day, without the delay of transports. Will it be contended that 

 the attack in that form would have been repulsed with the means then in Gen- 

 eral Jackson's hands? Would the landing, or even the presence on board these 

 steamships, of the British troops have been necessary to burn the city or put it 

 under contribution] Is there anything now, but the existence of forts on the 

 river, to prevent the success of such an attack by fifteen or twenty steamers of 

 war, allured there by the vastly increased magnitude of the spoil? "* 



While the enemy's means of attack are thus enhanced by the use of war 

 steamers, General Totten contends that they cannot be relied upon, as a substi 

 tute tor fortifications, for defence. 



" I do not assert," he says, " that armed vessels would not be useful in coast 

 defence. Such an idea would be absurd. I shall even have occasion to show 

 a necessity for this kind of force, in certain exceptional cases. It is the general 

 proposition, viz., that armed vessels, and not fortifications, are the proper defences 

 for our vulnerable points — a proposition the more dangerous, because seem- 

 ingly in such accordance with the well-tried prowess and heroic achievements 

 of the navy, that we have now to controvert. 



"Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, and New Orleans 

 are, we will suppose, to be guarded, not by forts, but by these vessels, on the 

 occurrence of a war with a nation possessing large naval means. We know 

 that it is no effort for such nations to despatch a fleet of twenty liue-of- battle 

 ships and frigates, or an equal number of war steamers, or even the combined 

 mass — both fleets in one. 



" What, then, shall we do at the above-named ports severally ? Each is 

 justly felt to be an object worthy of an enemy's efforts, and each would be cul- 

 pable in sending elsewhere any part of the force required for its own defence. 

 Each, therefore, maintains a naval force equal, at least, to that the enemy is 

 judged to be able to send promptly against it. Omitting any provision for 

 other places scarcely less important, what is the result? It is, that we main- 

 tain within the harbors of, or at the entrance to, these places, chained down to 

 this passive defence, a force at least six times as large as that of the enemy. 



" He does not hesitate to leave his port, because it will be protected in his 

 absence by its fortifications, which also afford him a sure refuge on his return. 

 He sails about the ocean, depredating upon our commerce with his privateers 

 and small cruisers, putting our small placrs to ransom, and in other ways fol- 

 lowing up appropriate duties ; all which is accomplished without risk, be- 

 cause our fleet, although of enormous magnitude, must cling to ports which 

 have no other defence than that afforded by their presence. They cannot com- 

 bine against him singly, for they cannot know where he is ; and must not, 

 moreover, abandon the object which they were expressly provided to guard. 



" It would really seem that there could not be a more impolitic, inefficient, 

 and dangerous system, as there could not certainly be a more expensive one." 



I have thus extensively quoted from the reports of General Totten, because 

 they are themselves the best expressions of the life labors and services of the 

 subject of our memoir, and because I think they treat of matters which should 

 be, in an eminent degree, interesting to the members of this National Academy, 

 and which, moreover, should demand its attention. 



To preserve the continuity of my subject, I have followed these reports down 

 to a late date. It is necessary now to revert to an earlier period. It has 



* The experience of the rebellion has proved the truth of General Totten's words. The 

 moment the forts were passed, the city of New Orleans was, notwithstanding the land forces 

 under Lovell, at Commodore Farragut's mercy. I have alluded elsewhere to the failure of 

 the forts. 



