1906.] on Imperial Defence. 283 



In spite of all the lessons we then received we are not secure, nor by 

 the reorganisation of the Regular Forces alone can we ever make 

 ourselves secure. If all the initial efficiency of the professional Army 

 of which complaint was so loudly, and to a certain extent justly, made 

 during the South African War — were all that initial inefficiency finally 

 and completely remedied, the insufficiency of our trained numbers 

 would remain. We should still be without a real National Reserve ; 

 we should still be without the power of immediate expansion upon the 

 outbreak of serious hostilities. We could only grapple with the 

 situation as before, by pulling society to pieces in the endeavour to 

 improvise a real War Army, while a more numerous enemy would be 

 already making dangerous progress upon the scene of action, and 

 already bringing masses of fully trained Reserves into play. 



In other words, no matter how highly efficient our small Regular 

 Army might be, our numbers would still have to be largely supple- 

 mented by more or less haphazard methods, and by the use of raw 

 and therefore untrustworthy military material. We cannot tell what 

 new emergencies may occur, or under what military conditions the 

 destinies of the British Empire may once more be at stake, directly or 

 indirectly, upon our own frontiers or elsewhere. Amid nations which 

 are ready for war we shall remain unready, and we shall be liable to 

 pay the penalty, perhaps even upon a larger scale than before, and 

 with more irretrievable, more fatal results. 



As I have said on previous occasions, the Regular portion of the 

 Army is no doubt improved from what it was at the outbreak of the 

 South African campaign ; but there is no expert of military reputa- 

 tion, there is no man who has given really serious and deep attention 

 to the subject, who believes that our existing arrangements can 

 promise us success, or ensure us against disaster in any great 

 emergency. We have been proceeding on the assumption and the 

 hope that no great emergency will occur. We all pray that that hope 

 may be realised, but I should be wanting in my duty if I failed to 

 urge upon my fellow-countrymen, with all the conviction I possess, 

 that that hope is a broken reed to depend upon. 



Whether the Regular Army is slightly larger or slightly smaller, 

 it cannot settle the problem or provide a reasonable guarantee for 

 national security while the National Reserves, which ought to supple- 

 ment it on any serious emergency, remain altogether non-existent. 

 Our National Military problem has been rather confused than simpH- 

 fied in the minds of the people by the thoughtless condemnation to 

 which the Regular Army has at times been subjected. No doubt it 

 was not, and may not yet be perfect. Much has been done for its 

 improvement in the last few years, but much remains to be accom- 

 plished. The Regular Army has profited, as any Army must always 

 profit, by the searching light thrown upon it by actual war ; but, as 

 some remarks of my own upon this subject have recently been mis- 

 understood, I wish very strongly to declare my opinion that the short- 



