1906.] on Imperial Defence. '2^1 



similar number of troops than have ever previously been despatched 

 from our shores at any one time. That number, however, would be 

 as totally inadequate for any grave emergency of the future as our 

 available forces at the outbreak of the South African War were in- 

 adequate to grapple by themselves with the crisis at that time. Even 

 120,000 men, or something like three Army Corps, would be utterly 

 insufficient as reinforcements in time of need for the defence of our 

 Asiatic frontiers. How much less would they suffice to enable us, 

 under modern conditions, to fulfil such of the historic purposes of 

 our policy in Europe as circumstances may again compel us to pursue. 

 The destinies of England may once more be decided in the future, as 

 they have been many times in the past, on Continental soil. 



There are neutral Powers which we could not with safety allow to 

 be blotted from the map, and thus transfer to other hands the keys of 

 sea-power itseK. 



We have again reached a period where the maintenance of the 

 status quo in Europe, as well as in Asia, must be regarded for many 

 obvious reasons, upon which it is unnecessary to enlarge, as one of 

 the paramount interests, and even one of the unwritten obligations, 

 of British policy. But with a system aiming to provide at the utmost 

 an Expeditionary Force of two or three Army Corps, it is obvious 

 that we can take no independent action abroad in defence of neutrals, 

 and that we cannot hope even to throw enough weight into the 

 balance to turn the scale in favour of our allies. In other words, we 

 cannot exercise that general influence upon the side of peace which 

 it is desirable in our own interests that we should be able to exercise. 

 An Army and a Reserve must be combined to make an efficient 

 organisation for war. We have one part of the machine, but we are 

 entirely without the other. The Regular Army, whether, as I have 

 said, its numbers are to be in the long run slightly more or slightly 

 less, is moving upon the right lines, and we may hope that it will 

 continue, irrespective of our party system, to progress in the direc- 

 tion of developing the highest degree of active fighting efficiency 

 which it can be made to yield in proportion to its numbers. So far, 

 we must all feel ourselves in hearty agreement with the many admir- 

 able passages in the speech — in some respects an epoch-making speech 

 — made by Mr. Haldane in explaining the Army Estimates. But the 

 points to which I have endeavoured to call your attention to-night is 

 that, altogether apart from the professional organisation of the Regular 

 Army, the fundamental problem of readiness for war is one that has 

 remained wholly untouched since the South African War, and it is 

 the one really decisive and searcliing problem of the present and the 

 future in connection with all that is vaguely known as Army Reform. 



The question upon which earnest and intelligent discussion must 

 more and more concentrate itself is the question not of Reform within 

 the Regular Army, but of securing some national power of miUtary 

 expansion outside the necessarily extremely limited resources of that 



