1898.] on ''Marked Unexplored:' 665 



consider how a scheme so powerfully supported was not carried out, 

 we must first ask why F>iigland and Austria (neither power yielding 

 to the other in hatred of Napoleon and his family) came to sanction it. 



It was a question of military expediency. On the 28th of October, 

 1813, the Allied Armies halted on the right bank of the Khine. But 

 they durst pursue Napoleon no further ; and waited for their left 

 wing to swing round and take Napoleon in the rear. But their left 

 wing could not swing round. Marshal Bellegarde, commanding the 

 Austrian army, refused to move a man under existing circumstances. 

 He openly stated that the Allies must come to a compromise. Some- 

 how or other Murat must be detached from Napoleon's cause in order 

 to break up the deadlock in Italy. 



The fourth map. The deadlock in Italy was caused in this way. 

 Eugene Beauharnais' army of 40,000 men practically held in check 

 the Austrian army of 70,000, because Bellegarde was compelled to 

 detach an army corps to watch Murat, who in his turn could do 

 nothing because he was between Bellegarde and Bentinck. If Murat 

 could only be won over to the cause of the Allies, they would 

 command 120,000 men to Beauharnais' 40,000, and France could 

 easily be invaded by way of the Riviera. Murat deserted the 

 Emperor, and threw in his cause with the Allies ; his price being his 

 own definite and ofiieial recognition as King of Naples, while he on 

 his part consented to recognise Ferdinand as King of Sicily. 



Murat's conduct has been variously described. We shall see, 

 presently, what Bentinck thought of it. M. Thiers records that 

 Napoleon said that he had made a great mistake in making Murat 

 a king, as he now thought only of his own kingdom and France 

 came second. Murat himself stated that ho was now an Italian, 

 and thought only of the interest of Italy. The Austrians thought 

 that Muiat meant to make the most for himself out of the situation, 

 that his defection might be useful to them, and that, further, Murat 

 had excellent grounds for dissatisfaction with his brother-in-law's 

 interfering and imperious behaviour. 



Be that as it may, Murat quitted the Grand Army after a violent 

 quarrel with the Emperor, and betook himself to Italy with the object 

 of unifying it in the manner I have briefly sketched. 



At this time Lord William Bentinck was Commander-in-Chief and 

 Ambassador Extraordinary in Sicily. He commanded about 30,000 

 men. Bellegarde was the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, Count Mier 

 was the Austrian Charge d' Affaires, and Count Neipperg was the 

 Austrian Ambassador Extraordinary charged with the execution of 

 the Treaty of Alliance and Recognition. Lord William Bentinck 

 was charged with the same duty on the part of England. 



Lord William Bentinck received his instructions early in January 

 1814 from Lord Castlereagh. This is the temper in which he 

 received them. "I was always afraid that Count Neipperg would 

 be overreached by that Italian court " (meaning Naples). *' The 

 conditions of this treaty are altogether impolitic, inexpedient and 



