1880.] 011 Goethe 8 * Farhenlehre: 355 



main foundation of tlic moral law is a good will* which, in accordance 

 with its own nature, is anxious only for the right. The main founda- 

 tion of character is a strong will, without reference to right or wrong, 

 good or bad, truth or error. It is that quality which every party 

 prizes in its members. A good will cherishes freedom, it has reference 

 to the inner man and to ethical aims. The strong will belongs to 

 nature and has reference to the outer world — to action. And inas- 

 much as the strong will in this world is swayed and limited by the 

 conditions of life, it may almost be assumed as certain that it is only 

 by accident that the exercise of a strong will and of moral rectitude 

 find themselves in harmony with each other." In determining 

 Newton's position in the series of human characters, Goethe helps 

 himself to images borrowed from the physical cohesion of matter. 

 Thus, he says, we have strong, firm, compact, elastic, flexible, rigid or 

 obstinate, and viscous characters. Newton's character he places under 

 the head of rigid or obstinate, and his theory of colours Goethe pro- 

 nounces to be a petrified aper^u. 



Newton's assertion of his theory, and his unwavering adherence to 

 it to the end of his life, Goethe ascribes straight off to moral obliquity 

 on Newton's part. In the heat of our discussion, he says, we have 

 even ascribed to him a certain dishonesty. Man, he says, is subject 

 to error, but when errors form a series, which is followed pertina- 

 ciously, the erring individual becomes false to himself and to others. 

 Nevertheless reason and conscience will not yield their rights. We 

 may belie them, but they are not deceived. It is not too much to say 

 that the more moral and rational a man is, the greater will be his 

 tendency to lie when he falls into error, and the vaster will be that 

 error when he makes up his mind to persist in it. 



This is all intended to throw light upon Newton, but when Goethe 

 passes from Newton himself to his followers, the small amount of 

 reserve which he exhibited when dealing with the master entirely 

 disappears. He mocks their blunders as having not even the merit of 

 originality. He heaps scorn on Newton's imitators. The expression 

 of even a truth, he says, loses grace in repetition, while the repetition 

 of a blunder is impertinent and ridiculous. To liberate oneself from 

 an error is difficult, sometimes indeed impossible for even the strongest 

 and most gifted minds. But to take up the error of another, and per- 

 sist in it with stiffuecked obstinacy, is a proof of poor qualities. The 

 obstinacy of a man of originality when he errs may make us angry, but 

 the stupidity of the copyist irritates and renders us miserable. And if in 

 our strife with Newton we have sometimes passed the bounds of mode- 

 ration, the whole blame is to be laid upon the school of which Newton 

 was the head, whose incompetence is proportional to its arrogance, 

 whose laziness is proportional to its self-sufficiency, and whose virulence 

 and love of persecution hold each other in perfect equilibrium. 



* I have rendered Goethe's " gute Wille " by good will ; his " Wollen," which 

 he contrasts with "Wille," I have rendered by strong will. 



2 B 2 



