1888.] on the Invincible Armada : a Tercentenary Betrospect. 309 



on our own grievances, real and sentimental. What brought 

 matters to a climax were the embargo laid on English shipping 

 in Spain in May 1585, and the dread of Spain, which could now 

 only be considered as a hostile power, obtaining the command of 

 the Dutch ports.* It is not a little curious to note how the war 

 between the two countries, which avowedly began in 1585, anticipated 

 the lines of the war of the French Revolution two centuries later. 

 In both cases the immediate cause of war was the dread of a hostile 

 power fortifying itself in the sea-ports of the Netherlands ; to prevent 

 this a levy of men was ordered ; the newly-raised army was sent 

 abroad under an incompetent general, whose sole title to command 

 was royal favour — it matters little whether he was called Earl of 

 Leicester or Duke of York — and the result was ignominious failure. 

 But meantime the English fleet swept the West Indies, and Drake's 

 expedition of 1585-6 was the precursor and prototype of Jervis's 

 campaign of 1794. It will be seen that this correspondence was not 

 only in the commencement of the wars, but also in their more advanced 

 stages ; that the flat-bottomed boats at Dunkirk were imitated by those 

 at Boulogne ; and that the destruction of the enemy's ships at Cadiz 

 in 1596 presents a very exact analogy to the final overthrow of 

 Bonaparte's schemes at Trafalgar. 



Drake's brilliant raid through the West Indies determined Philip 

 on a decided course. For the past fifteen years the invasion of 

 England had been mooted, as a thing, desirable and not impossible. 

 It had been proposed by the Duke of Alva in 1569 ; and more recently, 

 in 1583, after his victory over Strozzi and his scratch fleet — mostly 

 of French adventurers — at Tercera, the Marquis of Santa Cruz had 

 urged it as a necessary step towards the reduction of the rebellious 

 Netherlands.! The Duke of Parma had written to the same effect, 

 repeating that English soldiers were of little count in j^resence of the 

 Spanish veterans, and adding a statement, w^hich seems to have obtained 

 general credence among the Spaniards, that the English ships at 

 Tercera had been the first to fly ; had, in fact, jjlayed a part some- 

 what resembling that of the Egyptian ships at Actium. It is quite 

 possible that there were some English ships at Tercera, though it is 

 doubtful ; if there were, they certainly did not imitate Strozzi's ill- 

 judged and suicidal manoeuvre of closing with the Spaniards, and — 

 small blame to them — effected their escape. True or not, how^ever, it 

 appears certain that this reported flight of the English ships did have 

 very considerable weight with many of the king's advisers ; and so 

 advised, and at the same time imj)elled by wrath, he determined on 

 the attempt. The Marquis of Santa Cruz was called on for his 

 scheme, which extended to gigantic proportions. Everything was to 



* ' State Papers,' Domestic, clxxx. 35-40. 



t 'La Armada Invencible,' por el Capitan de Navio C. Fernandez Duro, 

 tom. i. p. 241. Many of the papers collected by Captain Duro have been published 

 elsewhere ; many others are published by him for the first time : as one easily 

 available source, it seems more convenient to refer for all of them to his most 

 interesting and valuable work. 



