Lxir 



This discourse was decidedly on a higher level than the preceding, and 

 contained a great deal worthy of attention. As regards the theory of mimicry, 

 however, it was greatly lacking in force as well as in logical argument. Instead 

 of the latter he employed propositions devoid of scientific foundation — nothing 

 but hollow phrases — therefore a priori reasoning, while he entirely omitted 

 to make the requisite examination of the ways in which the opponents of the 

 theory in question explain the phenomena which are indicated as mimicry and 

 their refutation consequently was not attempted. Whether it be owing to 

 inability or to prejudice, when no cognizance is taken thereof the treatment of 

 the subject becomes of necessity so infomplete that no value can be attached 

 to it. Mr. Jordan professes to find a proof of the existence of mimicry in 

 the circumstance that in several cases where the models belong to different 

 species their mimics, on the other hand, are simply forms of one single 

 species, these forms not possessing the characters of incipient species and 

 their origin, therefore, being unexplainable otherwise than by natural selection 

 on account of their mimetic protection. This reasoning, therefore, likewise 

 proceeds a priori from the proposition that these butterflies are each others, 

 models or mimics respectively and that their resemblance cannot be attributed 

 to other causes. The correctness of this proposition should, however, be first 

 established scientifically and its proof, therefore, produced. But this again is 

 not attempted by Mr. Jordan and his observations are, therefore, valueless. 

 Mr. Jordan looks for the force of his reasoning, to a great extent, in the 

 Darwinian theory that every new variation occurs because of the utility which 

 accompanies it and in that of natural selection. Conceived in so general and 

 far-reaching a sense, however, these theories are not tenable. 



Whosoever observes the phenomena of nature from an independent stand- 

 point and without being influenced by prevalent theories is bound to arrive at 

 the conclusion that a certain number of variations are useful to the creatures 

 in which they occur, while others must be considered detrimental or at least 

 in no wise to satisfy a specific want. It is by no means to be assumed, there- 

 fore, that new forms of necessity are referable to their utility. Resemblances 

 may, consequently, very well occur without being of any advantage. The 

 doctrine of natural selection does not possess the value either which the sup- 

 porters of the theory of mimicry attach to it. This doctrine rests entirely on 

 that of the struggle for existence, it is, in fact, a natural corollary of it but 

 only in the original Darwinian sense, according to which the whole of animate 

 nature was regarded as waging a fierce mutual contest which was supposed to 

 lead to the sole survival of the fittest. Soon, however, the error of this con- 

 ception concerning this so universal, exclusive, and fierce character of nature 



