CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 35 



coast of America, and for forbidding foreign vessels to approach his 

 possessions within a distance of 100 Italian miles. 



. . . It was, on the contrary, because she regarded those rights of 

 sovereignty as legitimate, and because imjierious considerations inv(dv- 

 ing the very existence of the commerce Avhich she carries on in the 

 regions of the north-west coast of America compelled her to establish 

 a system of precautions which became indispensable that the caused 

 the Ukase of the 4th (16th) September, 1821, to be issued. 



. . . Conseiiiieutly, theEmperorhascharged hisCabiuettodeclare 

 to the Duke of Wellington (such declaration not to prejudice his 

 rights in any way if it be not accepted) that he is ready to fix, by 

 means of friendly negotiation, aud on the basis of mutual accommo- 

 dation, the tlegrees of latittide and longitude which the two Powers 

 shall regard as the utmost limit of their possessions and of their estab- 

 lishments on the north-west coast of America. 



43 His Imperial Majesty is pleased to believe that this negotia- 

 tion can be completed without difticulty to the mutual satisfac- 

 tion of the two States; and the Cabinet of Russia can from this 

 moment assure the Duke of Wellington that the measures of precau- 

 tion and supervision which will then be t;iken on the Russian part of 

 the coast of America will be entirely in conformity with the rights 

 derived from sovereignty, and with the established customs of nations, 

 and that there will be no jjossibility of legitimate cause of complaint 

 against them. 



Ag:aiii, oil the 28th November, 1822, the Duke of Welliug- 

 toii addressed a note to Count Lieven. contaiuiiig the fol- 

 ]o^villg■ words: 



The second ground on which we object to the Ukase is that His Sec Appendix, 

 Imperial Majesty thereby excludes from a certain considerable extent Y^''- 'J- ^''"^ ^• 

 of the ojieu sea vessels of other nations. We contend tliat the assump- 

 tion of this power is contrary to the law of nations, and we can not 

 found a negotiation upon a pai)er in which it is again liroadly asserted. 

 We contend that no Power whatever can exclude another Irom the use 

 of the open sea. A Power can exclude itself Ironi the navigation of a 

 certain coast, sea, &c., by its own act or engagement, but it can not 

 by right be excluded by another. This we consider as the law of 

 nations, and we can not negotiate upon a paper in which a right is 

 asserted inconsistent with this ])rinciple. 



At an early date in the course of the negotiations with 

 the United States and witli Great Britain the execution of 

 tlie Ukase beyond the territorial limit of 3 miles was sus- 

 peiuled. Indeed, as far as the waters of Behring Sea are 

 concerned, it may safely be said that it was never put into ^•of'^'^ii^P^art'^'i' 

 practical execution beyond this limit. The note from Count xo.' si! 

 Nesselrode to Mr. Middleton on the subject Mas dated the American state 

 1st August, 1822, and is thus alluded to by Mr. ]\Iiddleton I'ai'frs. I'oreign 

 in a despatch to Mr. Adams of the 19th September, 1823: pf448!""'^' ^ ° ' ^' 



Upon Sir Charles [Bagot] expressing his wish to be informed respect- 

 ing the actual state of the )ior///-H'es^ question between the United States 

 and Russia, so far as it might be known to me, I saw no objection to 

 making a coiifidrntUil communication to him of the note of Count Nes- 

 selrode, dated the 1st August, 1822, by which, in fact, staying the 

 execution of the Ukase above mentioned, Russia has A-irtually aban- 

 doned the pretensions therein advanced. 



The communication to the British Government on see Appendix, 



44 the same subject wasmadein Augustl823 m theshape xi.' 29.' ^'^^^ ^' 

 of an extract from a despatch from Count Nesselrode 



to Count Lieven, dated the 20th June, 1823. The following 

 passage in it shows how complete was the abandonment 

 of the unusual claim of maritime jurisdiction: 



'J'hat the Commanders of our ships of war must confine their sur- 

 veillance as nearly as possible to the mainland, i. e., over an extent of 



