CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 103 



of tlio Government in them, liufi also upon the position that this juris- 

 diction was asserted by Russia for more than ninety years, and by that 

 Government trausi'erred to the United States; and that negotiations 

 are pending upon the subject. 



The facts stated in this chapter sliow — 



That the original ground upon which the vessels seized 

 in 18SG and 1887 were condemned, was that Behring- Sea 

 was a m((re clansnm, an inland sea, and as such had been 

 conveyed, in part, by Kussia. to the United States. 



That this ground was subsequently entirely abandoned, 

 but a claim was then made to exclusive jurisdiction over 

 100 miles from the coast line of the United States' terri- 

 tory. 



That subsequently a- further claim has been set up to the 

 effect that the United States have property in and a right 

 of protection over fur seals in non-territorial waters. 



135 CHAPTER VIII. 



Point o op Article VI. — JIas the United States anyBiglit, 



and, if so, what Right of I*rotiction or Propertii hi the Fur Kisiit of pro- 

 Seals frequenting the Islands of the United States in /^V'//>'-,.rty'iuseai.s'oiu- 

 i7ig Sea when sueh seals are found outside the o/7//7<«>'y«i*i'»3-miie limit. 

 3-m%le limit f 



A NOVEL CLAIM. 



The claim involved in this question is not only new in 

 the present discussion, but is entirely without precedent. 

 It is, moreover, in contradiction of the position assumed by 

 the United States in analogous cases on more than one 

 occasion. 



The claim appears to be, in this instance, made oidy in 

 respect of seals, but the principle involved in it might be 

 extended on similar grounds to other animals ferw natura', 

 such, for instance, as whales, walrus, salmon, and marine 

 animals of many kinds. 



Apart from the ordinary limits of territorial jurisdiction 

 over waters adjacent to coasts, or to some exceptional con- 

 dition based upon agreement, there is absolutely no prece- 

 dent for the assum])tion of the right to property in a 

 free-swimming animal, whose movements are uncontrolled 

 and not controllable by man. 



Fur seals are indisputably animals /e/Yt'wa^j(rrt', and such 

 animals have been universally regarded by jurists as res 

 nullius until they are captured. No person can have 

 property in them until he has actually reduced them into 

 possession by capture. 



Why should there be a property in seals in Behring- Sea 

 alone? Outside Behring- Sea citizens of the United States 

 have pursued the seals for years as Canadians have done, 

 and are doing, without let or hindrance, and with the full 

 knowledge of the United States Government. 



The proposition that on one side of the Aleutian Archi- 

 pelago a seal is the property of the United States, and on 



