288 APPENDIX TO CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 



mouths of rivers have as well before as since the time of railroads controllefl the 

 business of the interior. For our national pride tlie thought, however, i,s unbeara- 

 ble that the Russian Eagle should possess a point which owes its importance to the 

 British Lion. The mouth of the Stikine must be ours, or at least an outer harbour 

 must be established on British soil from which our steamers can pass the Russian 

 girdle. Fort iSinipson, Dundas Land, Portland Canal, or some other convenient point, 

 most be selected for this purpose. Tlie necessity of speedy action in order to secure 

 the control of the Stikine is apparent. If we let slip tlie opportunity, so shall we 

 permit a Russian State to arrive iit the door of a British Colony. 



Thus, if wemay credit this colonial ejaculation, cauglittip and preserved 

 by German science, the liussian pos.sessions were destined to round and 

 complete the domain of Great Britain on this continent. Tlie Enssian 

 "Eagle" will give way to the British "Lion." The Anglo-Norman was 

 to he master as far as Behring Straits, across which he might survey 

 his Russian neighbour. How thiswasto be accomplished is not precisely 

 explained. The promises of gold on the Stikine failed, and it is not 

 improbable that this colonial plan was as unsubstantial. Colonists 

 become excited easily. This is not the first time in which Eussian 

 America has been menaced in a similar way. During the Crimean war 

 there seemed to be in Canada a spirit not unlike that of the Vancouver 

 journalist, unless we are misled by the able pamphlet of Mr. A. K. Eoche, 

 of Quebec, where, after describing Eussian America as "richer in 

 resources and capabilities than it has hitherto been allowed to be either 

 by the English who shamefully gave it up, or by the Eussians who cun- 

 ningly obtained it," the author urges an expedition for its conquest and 

 annexation. His proposition fell on the happy termiimtion of the war, 

 but it exists as a warning, with a notice also of a former English title 

 " shamefully" abandoned. 



This region is distant enough from Great Britain; but there is an 

 incident of past history which shows that distance from the Metropoli- 

 tan Government has not excluded the idea of war. Great Britain could 

 hardly be more jealous of Eussia on these coasts than was Spain in a 

 former day, if we may credit the Eeport of Humboldt. I quote again 

 his authoritative work, " Essai Politique sur la Nouvelle-Espagne" (Tom. 

 1 p. 345), where it is recorded that as early as 1788, even while peace 

 was still unbroken, the Spaniards could not bear the idea of Eussians 

 in this region, and when in 1790 the Emperor Paul declared war on 

 Spain the hardy project was formed of an expedition from the Mexican 

 ports of Monterey and San Bias against the Eussian Colonies, on which 

 the philosophic traveller remarks, in words which are recalled by the 

 Vancouver manifesto, that "if this project had been executed the world 

 wouldhave witnessed two nations in conflict, which, occupying the oppo- 

 site extremities of Europe, found themselves neighbours in another hemi- 

 sphere on the eastern and western boundaries of their vast Empires." 

 Thus, notwithstanding an intervening circuit of half the globe, two 

 Great Powers were about to encounter each other on these coasts. But 

 I hesitate to believe that the British of our day in any considerable 

 numbers have adopted the early Spanish disquietude at the presence of 

 Russia on this continent. 



THE AMITY OF RUSSIA. 



5. There is still another consideration concerning this Treaty which 

 nnist not be disregarded. It attests and assuies the amity ol' llus- 



5G sia. Even if you doubt the value of these i>ossessious, the Treaty 

 is a sign of friendship. It is a new ex])ression of that entente 



cordiale between the two I'owers which is a ])henomenon of history. 



Though unlike in institutions, they are not unlike in recent experience. 



