290 APPENDIX TO CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 



SHALL THE TREATY BE RATIFIED? 



Such are some of the obvious coiisideiatioiis ot a ji<^iicral character 

 beariiii;' on the Treaty. Tlie interests of tiie Pacific States; the exten- 

 sion of the national domain; the extension of lle])ubhcan institutions; 

 the foreclosure of adverse British possessions and the amity of Rus- 

 sia; tl)ese are the points wliich we have passed in review. Most of 

 these, if not all, are calculated to impress the public mind; but 1 can 

 readily understand a difference of opinion with regard to the urgency 

 of negotiation at this hour. Some may think that tin; purchase-money 

 and tlie annual outlay which must follow might have been i)ostponed 

 for another decade, while Russia continued in possession as a trustee 

 for our benefit. And yet some of the reasons for the Treaty do not seem 

 to allow delay. 



At all events, now that the Treaty has been signed by Plenipoten- 

 tiaries on each side duly empowered, it is difficult to see how we can 

 refuse to comi)lete the purchase without putting to hazard the friendly 

 relations which happily subsist between the United States and Russia. 

 The overtures originally proceeded from us. After a delay of years, 

 and other intervening propositions, the bargain was at length con- 

 clnded. It is with nations as with individuals. A bargain once made 

 must be kept. Even if still open to consideration it must not be lightly 

 abandoned. I am satisfied that the dishonour of this Treaty, after 

 what has ])assed, would be a serious res])onsibility for our country. As 

 an international question, it would be tried by the public opinion of the 

 world, and there are many who, not appreciating the requirement of 

 our Constitution by which a Treaty must have "the advice and consent 

 of the Senate," would regard its rejection as bad faith. There would be 

 jeers at us and jeers at Russia also; at us for levity in making overtures, 

 and at Russia for levity in yielding to them. Had the Senate been con- 

 sulted in advance, before the Treaty was signed or either Power 

 57 publicly committed, as is often done on important occasions, it 

 would now be under less constraint. On such a consultation 

 there would have been an opportunity for all possible objections, and 

 a large latitude to a reasonable discretion. Let me add that, while for- 

 bearing objection now, I ho]te that this Ti-eaty may not be drawn into a 

 precedent at least in the independent manner of its negotiation. I 

 would save to the Senate an important power that justly belongs to it. 



A CAVEAT. 



But there is one other i)oint on which I file my caveat. This Treaty 

 nuist not be a i)recedent for a system of indiscriminate and costly 

 annexation. Sincerely believing that Republi(;an institutions under 

 the primacy of the United States must embrace this whole continent, I 

 canm)t adopt the sentiment of Jefferson, who, Avhile confessing satis- 

 faction in settlements on the Pacific coast, saw there in the future 

 nothing but "free and independent Americans," bound to the United 

 States only by "ties of blood and interest" without political unity. 

 Nor am I willing to restrain myself to the i)riuci])le so tersely expressed 

 by Andrew Jackson in his letter to Prt*sident Monroe, " Concentrate 

 our poi)ulation, confine our frontier to proper limits, until our country, 

 to those limits, is filled with a dense population." But I cannot disguise 

 my anxiety that every stage in our ])redestined future shall be by 

 natural i)rocesses without war, and I would add even without purchase. 

 There is no territorial aggrainlizement which is worth tlie price of blood. 

 Only under peculiar (circumstances can it become the subject of pecu- 



