OEAL ARGUMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. PHELPS. 207 



That there is no right to visit in time of peace except in the execution of revenue 

 laws or other municipal regulations, in which cases the right is usually exercised 

 near the coast or within the marine league, or where the vessel is justly suspected 

 of violating the law of natious by piratical aggression; but wherever exercised, it 

 is a right of search. 



And that is where the question was left. That is the kernel of that 

 whole discussion, extracted from despatches that are voluminous and 

 will be interesting to be read by anybody wh§ desires to pursue this 

 subject further than it is at all necessary for me to pursue it. Lord 

 Aberdeen says: We do not claim the right of search in time of peace, 

 but we do claim the right of visitation and going on board and search- 

 ing for the necessary facts. In other words, we only claim in time of 

 peace the right of going as far as is necessary. Mr. Webster replies: 

 While you have not that right in this case, I admit that m time of peace, 

 you may visit when it is necessary, when there is a revenue law or any 

 aggression of regulations; that is generally exercised near the shore; 

 but it is a right of search wherever it is exercised. 



He was far too clear in his legal principles not to see that the moment 

 you set foot ujjon the vessel of the other nation in the exercise of a 

 claim of right that was a right of search, and that the definition of the 

 term was not to be limited by the enquiry whether you search the deck, 

 or the cabin, or the hold; that to board it at all for the purpose of 

 ascertaining facts was a right of search — a limited right, of course, but 

 limited by the necessity of the case. 



The case of the Trent has been alluded to in this connexion, and I 

 pass rapidly over these illustrations. There was a discussion between 

 Great Britain and the United States arising out of the taking by a 

 naval vessel of the United States of the ambassadors of the Confed- 

 erate States who were on their way to a European country out of a 

 British vessel. That vessel was overhauled, and they were taken out. 

 Great Britain demanded that they should be released ; and a discussion 

 took place. How did that come out*? I have no time to wade through 

 it; it is not useful. The precedent arises from what was conceded, not 

 from what was claimed on one side or the other. Mr. Seward gave up 

 those men, upon the ground that if the United States had a right to 

 intercept them at all, it must, according to the established usage of 

 nations, have captured the vessel. That if the vessel was engaged in 

 such conveyance of contraband of war as the United States had a right 

 to object to, the rule on that subject had become settled and estab- 

 lished in international law, and the onlj' way was to capture the ves- 

 sel. Of course, if the occasion was not one that the United States had 

 a right to object to, then she could not interfere at all, and on that 

 ground you will find, if you pursue that somewhat interesting corre- 

 spondence, the men were given up. But a point that was mad and dis- 

 cussed then remains unsettled. It was asserted on the one side and 

 denied on the other, and there was no concession, and there was no 

 settlement, and that was whether ambassadors come within the rule 

 that excludes a neutral vessel from conveying the military and naval 

 oflBcers of one belligerent. It is quite well settled that a vessel exposes 

 itself to capture if it is made the means of transporting military or 

 naval officers for any State. Now it was said on the part of the United 

 States, this is equally witliin the spirit of the rule. Those ambassa- 

 dors, though not oflicers, either military or naval, were on their Avay 

 across the sea to negotiate an alliance or a recognition of the war. 

 Their business was directly in aid of the rebellion, and, if it succeeded, 



