ORAL ARGUMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. PHELPS. 217 



the right. In other words, the right to enforce them wouhl stand npon 

 the agreement, as the agreement would stand upon the award; but if 

 the judgment of the Tribunal should be that this right of prote(;tiou of 

 its property, of its interest, of all that it has there, resides in the United 

 States, my friend lias well said, there is no question about the enforce- 

 ment of that right. In the first place, because the question is not sub- 

 mitted to the Tribunal. In the second place, because Great Britain 

 has agreed in this Treaty to abide by and enforce the award; and it is 

 not to be assumed for a moment that that country would fail to observe 

 its agreement in that respect. Furthermore, suppose it did not — if I 

 am at liberty to state a supposition, the very statement of which might 

 otherwise be regarded as injurious, the right being declared it is sup- 

 posed and presumed either that, if it is not acceded to, the nation which 

 possesses the right knows how (in accordance with the usuage of 

 nations), to enforce it; and if, in attempting to enforce it should over- 

 step the limit of necessity and propriety, the country that is injured, on 

 the other hand, by that excess would know how to obtain redress. 

 That whole subject about which my learned friends have had so many 

 alarming prognostications, about the right of search, the right of this, 

 and the right of that, raises questions, which 1 respectfully say, as far 

 as regards this claim of right, the Tribunal has nothing at all to do 

 with. 



Now to come. Sir, as fast as I can to the particular facts that belong 

 to the application of this obvious and universal rule to this case. I 

 have assumed what I have said to be true. I have asserted those con- 

 ditions in trying to ascertain what the rule of law was — I have asserted 

 the conditions that are necessary to make the rule applicable. It is 

 one thing to establish a rule as an abstract one upon a hyi)othetical 

 case; it is quite another thing to apply that rule to the particnlar case 

 by proving that the conditions on which the rule rests are germain and 

 belong to the case under consideration. 



Let me clear away two or three points that are brief. In the first place 

 this is a national interest— an interest that belongs to the Government 

 of the United States as a government, and not to its people, except so 

 far as some of its citizens may enter into a contract with the Govern- 

 ment to engage in it. The islands were purchased from Kussia. By 

 an Act of Congress they are set apart for the home of this herd of 

 seals. They are neither sold as the Government lands are generally 

 sold, nor are they made open to entry of settlers, as lands have been 

 largely opened in the United States, under certain conditions. They 

 are reserved. Acts of Congress have been passed which my friend took 

 the trouble to go through and to point out to the Tribunal — a series of 

 Acts of Congress for the protection of the industry; for allowing Super- 

 intendents and officers appointed by the Government and paid by the 

 Government to reside there; making the killing of female seals crinu- 

 nal, or the killing of any seals by fire-arms; restricting the number 

 which the lessees of the Government might take; empowering the 

 Secretary of the Treasury from time to time to reduce that number as 

 far as the interests of the preservation of the herd might require: fix- 

 ing a Revenue for tlie (Government derived out of the i^roceeds of the 

 industry, directly or indirectly, which is quite large. The Revenue 

 derived by the Government under the normal condition of things under 

 the present leases and present arrangements, is a nnllion and a quarter 

 dollars. What the lessees make out of it is made by i)rosecuting the 

 industry as other employes do; and what the i)oor Indians make out 

 of it, is a better subsistence than they have had bel()re. 



