36 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q. C. M. P. 



latioiis as to pelagic sealing ? You are to make rules that are necessary. 

 A rule is uot necessary if it is utterly ineffective and utterly useless and 

 utterly insufficient; and therefore if the state of the case be — I know- 

 not what your opinion about it is — but if the state of the case in fact 

 be that if you proliibited pelagic sealing- tomorrow, but killing was to 

 go on on the islands, your pelagic sealing rules would not be worth the 

 paper they were written upon for the preservation of the seal species, 

 am I to be told that you have only the right to prohibit pelagic sealing"? 

 But we believe it is a necessary condition also for the preservation ot 

 the seal life that there shall be a cessation for a definite period of kill- 

 ing upon the islands too. 



It seems to me it would put this Tribunal into a most ludicrous and 

 false position to suggest that that argument is not perfectly and abso- 

 lutely sound. 



If, then, I have illustrated — and 1 do not know any answer to it — a 

 case in which it would be idle for you to make regulations which would 

 be ineffective and useless for the object in view without annexing con- 

 ditions, then I say it follows that you have the authority to annex those 

 conditions, and that if you believe, honestly and impartially and decide 

 as every one of you will, I doubt not, fairly between the conflcting 

 interests which are concerned, arrive at the conclusion that as a condi- 

 tion of any restriction upon the rights of the nationals of any country 

 upon the high seas, there ought to be an accompanying restriction with 

 a view^ to the i)reservation of seal life by definite regulations upon the 

 islands, that you have a perfect right to say, "our regulations are con- 

 ditional upon the observance of such regulations upon the islands". 



There is a further question which 1 think ought to be considered, 

 namely, as to whether or not it is in your power, and if in your power 

 Avhether in the exercises of your discretion you ought, to make your 

 rules permanent or temi^orary. I do not dispute that you have the 

 power to lay down rules, inflexible as the laws of the Medes and Per- 

 sians. I do not dispute that you have the powder to do so. 



Senator Morgan. — Still, Sir Charles, you would say, I suppose, after 

 this award had been made that the two Governments could dispense 

 with them if they chose to do so by agreement. We are not estab- 

 lishing a principle of international law, as I understand it. 



Sir Charles I^ussell. — No, Sir; I quite agree with you. 



Senator Morgan. — It is bound to be temporary in the sense that the 

 two Governments, by agreement hereafter, could dispense entirely with 

 them. 



Sir Charles Russell. — I have no doubt they could. Sir, but one 

 can conceive a case in which the United States might take one view 

 and in which Great Britain might take a different view. I quite admit. 

 Sir, what you say, that of course the parties to an agreement, can, by 

 mutual consent, put an end to the agreement. 



Senator Morgan. — But still these two governments could not abolish 

 any principle of international law by themselves. 



Sir Charles Kussell. — No; Except as between themselves cer- 

 tainly not. We are not now upon principles of international law". Ot 

 course you understand we are now upon the question of expediency. 



Senator Morgan. — I si>oke of that as an illustration, that is all. 



Sir Charles Russell. — Oh yes; 1 know. I think this point is not 

 unimportant. Sir. I think it is very important, from whatever point of 

 view it is looked at. I do not think this question of whether the regu- 

 lations ought to be tenqiorary oi' permanent is a question which can be 

 said to be in the interest of the United States more than in the interest 



