306 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 



used. To those who are accustomed to the law of England, there are 

 many very ordinary cases of that sort that could well be referred to. 

 I remember one for example, merely as an illustration, where, if I recol- 

 lect rightly, it was said that in au act of Parliament certain assign- 

 ments under certain circumstances should be held to be uull and void 

 to all intents and purposes whatever. It could not use a stronger 

 expression to avoid a document under any circumstances and in any 

 case; but that being under an insolvent act it was held, of course, that 

 it was only made void against an assignee in solvency. That is merely 

 an ilhistration of the elementary doctrine in law, that you must always 

 construe the words of a statute in relation to the circumstances out of 

 which the Act arises, aud the subject matter with which it deals, 

 always i)roviding of course that this must be a possible aud reasonable 

 construction. 



Now then, bearing that in view, let us see what is the fair construc- 

 tion of these words: 



If the determination of the foregoing questions shall leave the subject in snch 

 condition that the concurrence of Great Britain is necessary to regulations for the 

 proper protection and i)reservation of the fur-seal in or habitually resorting to the 

 Behring Sea. 



First does that mean, by any fair construction, tlie fur-seal which are 

 in or which habitually resort to the Behring Sea, no matter where tliey 

 may be found : — that if you find a fur-seal a thousand miles south of 

 Behring Sea, but which fur-seal for certain months of every year goes 

 to Behring Sea, it is to be within those regulations and that regulations 

 are to be protect it there'? Let me put what might be au analogous 

 instance. 



Supposing it was said that regulations should be framed for the i^ro- 

 tection of the safety and health of people living in or habitually resort- 

 ing to a certain city, say Paris, if you like. Would anybody say that 

 if you found a person at the other end of the world, in Egy]^t, for 

 instance, who spent three months of every year in Paris, that those reg- 

 ulations were to provide for his safety and comfort in Egypt, because he 

 was a person who habitually resorted to Paris'? And that is precisely 

 the case of the fur seals. Does it not reasonably mean when they are 

 habitually resorting, and at the time that they are so resorting? And 

 is it possible that such words can be used, is it not startling to hear 

 that they are intended to be used, to protect seals which habitually 

 resort to Behring Sea, no matter where they may be found, in any part 

 of the world, at any time of the year? And is such an analogy as I 

 have presented a forced analogy, is it not a reasonable analogy? 



The answer would be: No; what we mean is people who either live 

 there all the year or who are found there at certain periods of the year. 

 When they are fouud there we have to protect them by lu^oper regula- 

 tions and by proper enactments, but we have uot to follow tliem all 

 over the earth and protect them wlierever they may be found, at any 

 distance or at any time of the year, because for a certain period of the 

 year they resoit to the area wliich they are said to resort to and in con- 

 nection witli which the regulations are to be made, and as to which, my 

 learned friend says, the discussion has arisen. 



Our view, we think, is strengthened, at all events, by considering 

 the course of this discussion. What was it that the United States had 

 been attempting to do before that"? What area had they been attempt- 

 ing to police? They had been attempting to police Behring Sea. Tliey 

 had never attempted to police any other waters, or to extend their 

 jurisdiction for the protection of the seals, or exclusive jurisdiction, 



