308 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 



Behring Sea. To my apprebensiou there is perhaps a stronger argn- 

 uieiit than all; bnt all these arguments present tliemselves in ditt'ercnt 

 lights to diiferent minds. If the learned Attorney General is right in 

 the confinement of the area of rights to Behring Sea, then the result 

 of the construction of our friends is tiiat we should be worse off if we 

 succeeded in all our contentious as to rights than if we failed. Could 

 that have been intended? If the claim in question 5 is confiued to 

 Behring Sea then if we fail as regards that there would be no regula- 

 tions at all, because they would liave got all the rights they claim. 

 But they say, " If Great Britain succeeds as to that, and we have got 

 no rights, then we can get regulations all over the world". It is much 

 better for us that we should fail and they should succeed. Is that a 

 reasonable construction'? These are all considerations arising upon 

 the construction of the words. 



Senator Morgan. — It seems to me, Mr. Eobinson, that would depend 

 upon whether the purpose was to preserve the seals or whether the 

 purpose was to destroy them. 



Mr. Robinson. — I am perfectly willing to admit that the j^urpose was 

 not to destroy them. 1 here is no question about that; but, with great 

 deference, I cannot understand how that can affect the construction of 

 the treaty. 



Senator Morgan. — If the purpose is to preserve the seal, you would 

 not be any worse off' by doing it, would you? 



Mr. KoBiNSON. — I do not know. Does that affect the construction of 

 the Treaty? If what you mean to say is that the construction of this 

 treaty necessarily gives the right to do everything for the purpose 

 indicated, then that is simply deciding the question in advance, so to 

 speak. I am not here to say that we would be better or worse off by 

 destroying those seals than by saving them. I am simijlyhere to dis- 

 cuss whether the regulations to be imposed upon us as compulsory shall 

 extend beyond a certain area. This is a very serious question. It is 

 one thing for a nation to agree by convention and of her own free will 

 that regulations shall extend over a certain area. It is another thing 

 altogether to have those regulations imposed upon her against her will 

 by another power. We are quite willing to meet together and to agree, 

 if we can, or to leave it to other persons to arrange reasonable regula- 

 tions for the whole area where we think regulations are needed; but it 

 is one thing to do that and another thing to have regulations irai^osed 

 upon you by a Tribunal, without your consent, the observance of which 

 would involve an enormous expenditure and enormous difficulty, and I 

 might say in regard to tile proposition of my learned friends, almost 

 insuperaljle difficulty, whether you like it or whether you do not. 



Therefore we present all those considerations, and to my apprehension 

 the last one is perhaps the strongest, for it is founded on reason. Can 

 the parties have meant, when these questions of right were the real 

 substantial matters that had to be decided between the parties — can it 

 be contended that the power which failed on those questions should be 

 worse off" than if she had succeeded? If that was the purpose, what 

 was the ob^ct of submitting those questions? It would have been far 

 better that we should lose on the questions of right. 



So much for that question. 



The Tribunal here adjourned for a short time. 



Mr. Robinson. — Mr. President, Mr. Senator Morgan asked a question 

 as to the time of vessels going to Behring Sea, and I may say that if 

 you refer to the third volume of tlie A])i)endix to the Britisli Case, page 

 '6iiS, you will find all the particulars about that. I need not delay you 



