ORAL ASGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 321 



settlement; that is to say, it is final in the sense that it is irrevocable, 

 and both parties are bound by it. 



The President. — We cannot say that we could make no regulations, 

 if we act under the conditions provided ibr in Article VII. 



Mr. KoBiNSON. — I did not mean that, Mr. President. I mean if the 

 circumstances are such that you conceive it to be your duty to say that 

 no regulations are wanted, that would be a performance of your power 

 under the treaty. I was not referring to the special facts, or saying 

 that you ought not to make regulations. That is not what I was think- 

 ing of. I was saying that if in your judgment you should say no regu- 

 lations are wanted, that would be final. If you make regulations for a 

 year or ten years, that is final. That is to say, neither side has a right 

 to appeal against it, or to re-open the question so long as that deci- 

 sion lasts. 



Then in that point of view, what is the principle upon which these 

 regulations should be made? I venture to submit that there is but 

 one principle that can be adopted. You cannot make regulations 

 which will have any invariable and certain effect upon both or either 

 of these industries unless you subordinate one altogether to the other. 

 There is no priority between these industries. Nobody can point to a 

 law which says that our industry shall be prior to theirs or that their 

 industry shall be prior to ours. In other words, both sides have a 

 right, so far as law is concerned, to exercise their rights as they may 

 think proper. We have no power to i)reventthem from exterminating 

 the seals on the seal islands. You have no power to prevent them. 

 There is no right to say — when I am speaking of right, I mean no 

 equity of any kind — to say that our right, which has just been given 

 to us, shall be abolished in favor of land killing. 



1 venture to suggest again that the statement of that carries with it 

 its own absurdity on its face. Is it to be supposed that they are to be 

 better oft" without property than with property"? Is it to be supposed 

 that this Tribunal is to say to the United States in one sentence, "All 

 these rights which you have claimed we deny to you, they do not exist; 

 but we give you back all these rights and more too under the name of 

 regulations"? Is it possible that that could have been contemplated? 

 Or that they are to say to Great Britain, " You may go and seal as you 

 please; you may exercise your right, which we say is your lawful right, 

 to catch seals in the open sea"; and in the next sentence, "You must 

 never do it". Is that a sensible arrangement or a sensible award to 

 ask from any Tribunal? Is it possible that this is to be the result of 

 what these two sides, these two nations, have been contesting about 

 under the name of rights for the last three months? 



How can it be a matter of vital importance to each of them, to deny 

 and succeed in the denial of, or to assert and succeed in the assertion 

 of certain rights, when as a matter of fact it is utterly indifterent 

 whether the party claiming the rights has them or not, for he is per- 

 haps worse off if he gets the rights than if he did not get them. 



In answer to all these questions we say that the United States have 

 no right. With regard to the seventh question, we say they cannot be 

 better oft" than if they had no rights at all in. 



Tbe President. — You mean the right by award? You are able to 

 give it by convention or agreement or regulation. 



Mr. Robinson. — Oh, no doubt. I am not speaking of power. I am 



speaking of feirness. But is it sensible to say to Great Britain, " We 



award you all tliese rights, and then take them from you; and we not 



only take them from you, but order you to assist the United States in 



B s, pt XIV 21 



