ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q. C. M. P. 11 



draw that distinction wbicli mnst be drawn between those writers and 

 authorities, (I think erroneously called authorities), who deal with the 

 subject with a view to discover the metaphysical ri ounds, the ethical 

 reasons which may be advanced in support of this or that view, and those 

 writers (much less interesting- but much safer guides) who confine them- 

 selves to laying down what rules have in fact obtained the consent ot 

 nations. Therefore, it is important to call attention to the fact that 

 because various writers are constantly propounding ideas of their own, 

 suggesting these ideas as conformable to laws of natural reason and 

 right justice, because they are convinced that their views on those sub- 

 jects are right, — yet they are not to be accepted as authoritative expo- 

 nents of v>hat the law is, because neither doctrines derived from what 

 is called the law of nature, nor philanthropic ideas as to what is just or 

 humane, nor the opinions of text- writers however eminent, nor the 

 usages of individual States even if submitted to and followed by other 

 individual States, nor precedents, nor single instances, — none of these, 

 nor all combined, constitute International Law at all; although, as I 

 have said, they may help to stimulate the growth of public opinion among 

 civilised communities, the outcome of which at some future stage, by 

 means of some future develoi)ment, may be the incorporation of these 

 views, wholly or partially, into International Law. 



Now, Mr. President, I thought it well at an early stage, as I must 

 recur to this later, to state in this general way the propositions which 

 have to be discussed. liut there is one other matter as to which I am 

 glad to say I also find myself in complete agreement with my learned 



friend Mr. Carter. 

 733 The President. — First may I beg to put a question? You 



speak of International Law as comprising the customs and 

 usages of nations, on which difl'erent nations have agreed. 



I suppose you mean not only by written agreement, but also by right 

 of usage? 



Sir Charles Eussell. — Certainly. When I say ''to which they 

 have agreed", of course, I mean not merely or necessarily by a formal 

 or express or written agreement, but by any mode in which agreement 

 may be manifested, by which the Tribunal may arrive at the conclusion 

 that they have so agreed. 



Senator Morgan. — Including acquiescence? 



Sir Charles Russell. — Certainly. I use "agreed" in that broad 

 and general sense. 



Lord Hannen. — As a question of evidence. 



Sir Charles Russell. — As a question of evidence: the question 

 always is, plaGuitne geniihus f You may prove that it has pleased the 

 nations so to agree by any method by which that can be actually estab- 

 lished; by express agreement, or by usage, usage long and generally 

 concurred in, and so forth. 



I was saying there is one other point on which I find myself in agree- 

 ment with my learned friend, and that is that the mode in which this 

 question is to be determined by this Tribunal is infinitely more impor- 

 tant than the question itself; infinitely better v^ere it for the world that 

 the seals should be exterminated, and that the articlesof luxury which 

 are derived from them should ])erish from the iace of the earth — infi- 

 nitely i)referable were it that that should happen than that this Tribu- 

 nal should deflect a hair's breadth, in the decision of the questions, 

 from the true line of law. Now the importance of this question has 

 been so often referred to by my learned friend, in language of great 

 exaggeration, that I must beg permission for a few moments to reduce 



