110 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q. C. M. P. 



Tinder the Act of Congress, because under the Kaval Prize Act of 18G4 

 there is given to the Court of Admirality powers to act as a Prize 

 Court. Now he inoceeds. 



The tine fuiK'tioiis of a prize court are curtlj' expressed by Lord Mansfield in the 

 conrse of the judgment above referred to. " The end of a prize Conrt is, to sus- 

 pend the projierty till condemnation; to punish every sort of misbehaviour in the 

 captives; to restore instantly, ce/is Icvatis (as the books express it, and as I have 

 often heard Dr. Paul fiuote), if, ujion the most summary examination, there don't 

 appear sutticieut ground; to condemn finally, if the goods really are prize, against 

 everybody, giving everybody a fair opportunity of being heard. A captor may and 

 must force every person interested may force him to jn'oceed to condemn -without 

 delay". 



And Lord Stowell says: 



It is to be recollected that this is a court of the Law of Nations, though sitting 

 here under the authority of the King of Great Britain. It belongs to other nations 

 as well as to our own; and what foreigners have a right to demand from it is 

 852 the administration of the Law of Nations, simply and exclusively of the intro- 

 duction of principles borrowed from our own municipal .iurisprudence, to 

 which it is well known they have at all times exjiressed no inconsiderable reluctance. 



Let me repeat those Avords : 



And what foreigners have a right to demand from it is the administration of the 

 Law of Nations, simply and exclusively of the introduction of principles borrowed 

 from our own municiijal jurisprudence: 



Then: 



In forming my judgment, I trust that it has not for a moment escaped my anxious rec- 

 ollection wliat it is that the duty of my station calls from me, namely, not to deliver 

 occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national 

 interests, but to administer with indifference that justice which the Law of Nations 

 holds out without distinction to independent States, some happening to be neutral 

 and some belligerent; the seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here, in the 

 belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the 

 law itself has no locality. 



Now, I have further to point out that it is imi)ossible — even if it had 

 been before the learned Judge it would have been iini)ossible — for him 

 upon the grounds now advanced to have entered upon the question in 

 any other light than that in which he did enter upon it, namely, the con- 

 struction of this municipal Statute. Why? It is now said — and let 

 there be no doubt about the clearness of my enunciation of what is 

 now said — that the right of the United States is based upon the fact 

 of property in seals; property in, and industry founded upon, seals; 

 that that property right or interest carries with it furtlier the right to 

 do whatever in the judgment of the nation is reasonably necessary any- 

 where — everywhere — to protect that i^roperty and that property right. 

 That is the allegation. Let me point out that nowhere was that ever sug- 

 gested until the parties were preparing to come here to put this case 

 before you; that their case has been from the first based upon a right 

 restricted in a defined and local area. They say that this Statute is the 

 equivalent of an international regulation for the protection of their 

 own rights. It cannot be so treated. If it is a right that is incident 

 to property, it must follow property wherever property is: but this 

 international regulation embodied under this municipal Statute applies 

 to a defined area, the part of the Behring Sea east of the line of 

 demarcation. 



I sum up therefore the whole of my argument on this point by invit- 

 ing this Tribunal to find, first, the fact of these seizures; next, the fact 

 that they were seized by the authority of the United States; next, that 

 they were seized for breach of a municipal Act, aiul for that cause 

 only; next that the judgment was claimed, and the judgment was 



