178 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q. C. M. P. 



five as well as questions one, two, three, and four. But I do not wish 

 to anticipate. The point I am upon is this: you have, with great 

 deference, to answer the question in the sense in which you understand 

 that question: and the sense in which that question is to be under- 

 stood, I am respectfully submitting, is that the Tribunal is asked to 

 say whether Russia asserted and exercised — and I repeat my words, 

 asserted and exercised — territorial or sovereign authority, exclusive of 

 all other persons, in the Behring Sea. That is the question to which 

 you have to make your answer. 



The PRESiDErsT. — Certainly; one of the questions. 



Sir Charles Eussell. — As to the question of exclusive rights in 

 the seal fisheries, I have already dealt with that, and I cannot see that 

 there is much room for discussion or difference between us. There is 

 no suggestion that Eussia either asserted or exercised any rights in 

 relation to seal fisheries other than those that belonged to her, ratione 

 soli, as owner of the Pribilof Islands. 



Mr, Justice Harlan. — The difference between counsel, then, in 

 respect to this finding, I understand to be this : You assert that Eussia, 

 in these different ways you have pointed out, did assert, within the 

 meaning of that question, exclusive jurisdiction in the whole of 

 933 Behring Sea by this Ukase. On the other side, it is contended 

 that Eussia did not assert such exclusive Jurisdiction by that 

 Ukase, but expressly disclaimed a purpose to assert it. 



Sir Charles Eussell. — So I understand. But again. Judge, with 

 great deference, that statement illumines the point with which the 

 Tribunal must still deal, as to what is the meaning of the question. 



Mr. Justice Harlan. — I understand that. 



Sir Charles Eussell. — And my point is — and I submit I have dem- 

 onstrated it — that when " exclusive jurisdiction" is spoken of, it means 

 exclusive jurisdiction in Behring Sea; and an exclusive jurisdiction in 

 Behring Sea means exclusive jurisdiction in a particular and defined 

 area; and that exclusive jurisdiction in a particular and defined area 

 means territorial or sovereign jurisdiction, and nothing else. Of course 

 if I am to argue tlie question again as to what the Ukase meant, I 

 should have to go over the ground with which you are very familiar. 



Mr. Justice Harlan. — I think we all understood your argument. 



Sir Charles Eussell. — That I am not going to do; but how it can 

 be contended that when it is stated in the Ukase of 1821, 



the pursuits of commerce, whaliug and fishery, and of all other industry on all 

 islands, ports and gulfs, including the whole of the northwest coast of America, 

 beginning from Behriug Straits to the 51st degree of Northern latitude, also from the 

 Aleutian Islands to the eastern coast of Siberia, as well as along the Kurile Islands 

 from Behring Strait to the South Cape of the Island of Urup, viz, to the 45 degree 

 50 minutes northern latitude, is exclusively granted to Russian subjects: — 



and when in furtherance of that exclusive grant it is prohibited to all 

 foreign vessels to approach within less than one hundred Italian miles, 

 subject to confiscation : 



How those two, taken together, can be anything less than, or different 

 from, an assertion of territorial sovereignty, with a sanction to support 

 that territorial sovereignty, passes my comprehension. And that was 

 the case originally made by the United States. I will leave the subject 

 by citing one more passage from their Case, page 69. This makes it 

 apparent, unless I am greatly mistaken. It is near the top of page 69 : 



From the foregoing historical review it appears : 



First. That prior and up to the date of the Treaties of 1824 and 1825, Russia did 

 fvssert and exercise exclusive rights of commerce, hunting a?id fishing, on the shores 

 •and in all the waters of liehiiug Sea. 



