ORAL AEGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q. C. M. P 229 



society." Then my learned friend said, on page 393, that individnal 

 ownership was an invention of society, from which it would appear to 

 follow that coramniiity of property had existed previous to society; and 

 tiually he said that " property sprang from the necessity of peace and 

 of order." 



I quite agree; but when Adam walked out of the Garden of Eden, 

 there was no need of a policeman to keep order, and property grew 

 because the needs of society required that propei'ty should grow. Prop- 

 erty grew because of that desire, inherent in the human breast, for 

 peace, for order, for convenience, for the avoidance of disturbance; and 

 as society grew, even in its earliest and ludest stage, a certain moral 

 opinion grew with it, which gradually, at first in very small matters, 

 afterwards in much wider matters, grew to a recognition of a special or 

 exclusive right of user of particular things. But when my learned 

 friend in this connection goes on further to appeal to the law of nature, 

 I merely have to ask the Tribunal, what has the law of nature to do 

 with it? The law of nature, I suppose, means the natural law, or 

 994 the law in a natural state of society. Well, the law, so far as 

 there could be said to be law in a natural state of society, was 

 that a man got what he conceived to be necessary for his wants, and 

 stuck to it, as far as he was able to stick to it. I say it would be much 

 truer to say since my learned friend is relying upon the law of nature 

 to support his argument — it would be much truer to say that law in its 

 development, has not been based on the law of nature, but is in 

 restraint of the law of nature, which had for its sanction force, and 

 force only. 



But these propositions, while interesting to discuss, seem to me very 

 wide of the questions which we are here engaged upon; and I shall be 

 very glad, if, as the interval of adjournment has been a little longer than 

 usual, I might be allowed to go on a little further with this question of 

 property. 



The President. — Certainly. 



Sir Charles Eussell. — My learned friend, in his argument, stated 

 two propositions, one of which I admit to be substantially right, the 

 other of which I submit is radically wrong; and yet my learned friend 

 has put them together, and has said that they were in ^^ cnHera two 

 effect the same proposition. I think it would not be a proposiUoM as^o 

 Avaste of time if the Tribunal would allow me to read Hais^'exSniled^ 

 these two propositions without comment. In the first 

 instance, on page 379 of the print of my learned friend's argument, 

 he says: 



Now from all those authorities, drawn from the municipal law of many different 

 nations, confirmed by the ancient Roman law, these propoaitions are exceedingly 

 clear, that — 



This is his first proposition : 



In reference to wild animals, if by the art andindustry of man, they may be made 

 to return to a particular place to such an extent that the possessor of that place has 

 a power and control over them which enables him to deal with them as if they were 

 domestic animals, they are in law likened to domestic animals, and are made prop- 

 erty just as much as if they were domestic animals. 



That proposition is, I admit, substantially correct. Then he goes on, 

 a little farther down : 



And you may state another proposition fully substantiated by these authorities. 

 It is scarcely another proposition; it is almost the same thing, but the language is 

 iu a different form. 



