ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q. C. M. P. 239 



restricted to usufruct (which I say is not the law), he passes on to the 

 question of what nations may do with regard to their property or their 

 possessions; and in the printed report of liis argument, at page 399, 

 myfiiend shows he is quite consistent, because he proceeds to lay down 

 a series of extraordinary propositions to this effect: That if a partic- 

 ular nation produces a particular commodity the rest of the world can, 

 as of right, compel that nation to part with its commodity for 

 1 OOG the benefit of the world. He instanced the case of india-rubber; 

 he instanced the case of tea. Why not instance the case of 

 Bordeaux wine, or any other wine, or any other commodity? He says 

 even that if the interests of a particular nation will not prompt it (as 

 of couise it will), to exchange its commodities for other commodities of 

 the world, yet as a matter of international right, as a matter of law, a 

 strong nation can take a weak nation, so to speak, by the throat, and 

 compel it to sell its tea, compel it to sell its india-rubber, comj^el it to 

 sell its wine; the argument 1 venture to think being a good deal dam- 

 aged, when my friend felt compelled (in answer to a question addressed 

 to him by one member of the Tribunal), to admit so much at least as 

 this — that the nation which produced the particular commodity could 

 fix its own price. My learned friend admitted it could fix its own price, 

 but he i)ut a qualification on that — "so long as it is not i)rohibitory". 

 Who is to be the judge of whether it is prohibitory or not? All this, 

 I say, is enough to show the Tribunal that my learned friend is in all 

 this discussion arguing as a great thinker, adopting the thoughts of 

 great thinkers on ethical and metaphysical subjects, and applying 

 ethics and metaphysics to law. He is not, at least I cannot imagine 

 that he is, arguing as a lawyer to lawyers — as a judge to judges: he 

 is in an atmosphere, and at a point of elevation, quite beyond my 

 reach, or even, I will add, beyond the necessity of my even making 

 the attempt to reach him except in the way I am now doing. 



Xow I say with reference to each of these propositions — I care not in 

 what form they are stated, that they cannot be a(;cepted merely because 

 my friend is able to cite vague passages of theoretical writers, not 

 dealing as I have said, with the matter, as lawyers, which would give 

 some kind of colour, economically if you like, ethically if you like, to 

 these views. I am addressing a Tribunal called upon to declare legal 

 rights — that is common ground between us; and to support that i)osi- 

 tion, therefore, my friend is bound to produce authority of lawyers, of 

 judges, or to show (if he thinks that international law has any applica- 

 tion to the subject matter), that international law has either laid down 

 a principle within which his contention clearly falls, or has adopted a 

 concrete rule applicable to this case. I say he has done neither the 

 one nor the other; and if one comes to the basis of his argument, one 

 fails to see why, if there be any principle in it at all, it is to be confined 

 to one class of animals. Why is it to be confined to animals at all? If 

 usufruct only of property is to be allowed, why may a man eat up all 

 his capital? 



I presume my friend will not deny that there is no law which compels 

 a man merely to live upon the usufruct of his capital estate — tliat 

 there is no law which compels him to live only u]>on the interest of liis 

 invested money — that he may eat up his capital if he jdeases; and yet 

 my friend's argument, and the authorities he cites, show that he is 

 embracing within this comprehensive principle even the case I am put- 

 ting, for he cites economic writers to show that abstinence, or 

 1007 self restraint, or frugality — abstinence from spending is the 

 defence which these ethical writers make for the accumulation 

 of caxiitai, 



