298 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q. C. M. P. 



Again, take the case of the Kevenne Laws — the Hovering Acts, which 

 are referred to in the argument, as if they afforded some justiticatiou for 

 the position of the United States as to self defence or self preservation. 

 Upon what principle do those Acts rest? On the principle that no civ- 

 ilized State will encourage offenses against the laws of another State 

 the justice of which laws it recognizes. It willingly allows a foreign 

 State to take reasonable measures of prevention within a moderate dis- 

 tance even outside territorial waters; but all these offences, and all 

 offences of the same class and character relating to revenue and to 

 trade, are measures directed against a breach of the law contemplated 

 to be consummated within the territory, to the prevention of an offence 

 against the municipal law within the area to which the municipal law 

 properly extends. But it does not follow that all Acts of this kind will 

 in all cases meet with assent. It certainly would not, and could not be 

 expected to meet with assent, if the right were attempted to be exer- 

 cised — I use the word "right" in the laxer sense of the word: I would 

 prefer to say ''if the Acts were attempted to be enforced", — at a consid- 

 erable distance from land, and I affirm that in no such case by interna- 

 tional law, could it be maintained as of right against an objecting nation. 



As was said in the case my friend referred to in his Argument of 

 Church V. Hubbart, by Chief Justice Marshall, if the right is extended 

 too far, it will be resisted; in other words, he considers that it is a quasi- 

 right exercised by concession, and depending for its continued existence 

 upon consent and upon the moderation with which it is used. And, 

 indeed, as I read my friend Mr. Phelps' argument upon this point, he 

 seems to admit that that is the true view; because on pages 170 

 1077 and 171 my friend dealing with one of the contentions advanced 

 on the part of Great Britain, says : 



An effort is made in the British Counter Case to diminish the force of the various 

 statutes, regulations and decrees above cited, by the suggestion that they only take 

 effect within themunicipal jurisdiction of the couutries where they are promnlgated, 

 and upon the citizens of those countries outside the territorial limits of such 

 jurisdiction. 



Then my friend proceeds : 



In their strictly legal character as statutes, this is true. No authority need have 

 been produced on that point. But the distinction has already been pointed out, 

 which attends the operation of such enactments for such purposes. Within the ter- 

 ritory where they prevail, and upon its subjects, they are biudiug as statutes, whether 

 reasonable and necessary or not. 



That is true : Then he goes on to say " without", that is to say, outside 

 the territory : ^ 



Without, they become defensive regulations, which if they are reasonable and nec- 

 essary for the defense of a national interest or right, will be submitted to by other 

 nations, and if not, may be enforced by the government at its discretion. 



You see, Mr. President, once you criticize and appreciate the language 

 in which this is stated (which is in strict conformity with Church v. 

 Hubbart), you will see my friend is there referring to exactly the princi- 

 ple of the Hovering Acts, about which I shall have something to say in 

 a moment, that he is referring to something, not which the nation has 

 a legal right to do by a recognized rule of International law, but to 

 something which, so long as it is reasonable and necessary, ^'•will be 

 submitted to by other nations, and, if not, may be enforced by the 

 Government at its discretion." 



I need not say, therefore, that my friend's proposition consist^ of two 

 branches — first of all, that a defensive regulation which is reasonable 

 and necessary will be submitted to; secondly, that if it is not submitted 



