302 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q. C. M. P. 



Their case has been based upon alleged riglit, and based upon right 

 mainly and primarily upon the ground of extended territorial jurisdic- 

 tion over the waters of Behring Sea. We say therefore the true propo- 

 sition, the true limitation, iu such cases, in times of peace, as between 



„^ , ,. ., friendly Powers, is that there is no right by international 



The true limit, j. • j.i i • i> j.i t- t ^ ^^ 



of self-defence iu law to seize the ships ot auotlier nation — 1 am excluding 

 time of peace. cases withiu the Hovering Acts, which I have already 

 dealt with — that in time of peace there is no right to seize the ships of 

 another nation on the high seas except for piracj-. 



I may be asked, finally, may there uot be cases in which, although it 

 may not be possible to formulate the interests of a nation under any 

 recognized head of laAV, municipally or internationally regarded: yet 

 may there not be cases iu which there may be great interests of a nation 

 which yet call for and morally justify that nation iu acting, and acting 

 in assertion of those interests and in defence of them? Yes 5 there are 

 such cases; but what are they? They are cases which rest upon the 

 very same principle upon which nations have been driven, sometimes 

 justly, sometimes unjustly, to defend territory which they have acquired, 

 or to acquire territory in which they have by international law no right, 

 but which, either in pursuit of a great ambition, or in the gratiticatiou 

 of racial antipathy, or under the influence of the ambition of a great 

 potentate, they choose to think is necessary for the well-being and safety 

 of the nation. But that is not international law, or international right. 

 That is war, and is defended as war, and justified as war alone. 



And I do not hesitate, Mr. President, to follow out this illustration to 

 its conclusion. I do not hesitate to take the concrete case of these seals. 

 It would be remarkable if they did it, they would be very unwise if 

 they did it — extremely foolish if they did it — if I may respectfully say 

 so. But the United States might choose to say: — We regard the inter- 

 ests of fur-sealing as of so great a magnitude, as of so much importance 

 to the well-being of our great community, as so important to the advanc- 

 ing interests of oivilization the world over, that we will assert, right or 

 wrong, our claim against the world to protect the fur-seals iu Behring 

 Sea, or miles away from the Behring Sea. 



But that would be war. 



And there is another side to the question. Great Britain might choose 

 to say: — We consider the interests involved in this question as 

 1082 very great and very important — not merely to the interests of the 

 Canadians, to the interests of a ris'iug colony; but in view of the 

 broader and greater principle which we conceive to be involved, the 

 interference with the eqality of all nations on the high sea, the attempt 

 by one nation to usurp special privileges and special powers on the high 

 sea. We consider that question to be of so great importance that we 

 will defend it by force. 



But that again is war. 



That is uot international law; that is not international right; and 

 that is not the character of the question which this Tribunal has been 

 invoked to determine. In this at least we are agreed : that as regards 

 these questions which I am discussing (I have nothing to do with regu- 

 lations at this moment) as regards these questions of legal right, we are 

 to address you as lawyers would address judges, as advocates would 

 address jurists. 



Iu view of, aud after, this general statement upon this matter, I now 



Examination of ^^k your Consideration of the authorities cited by my 

 examples of acts of learned friend: and you will see that they fall wathin one 

 by unit'ed'^stat^'^s* or othcr of the Categories to which I have adverted, aud 



