336 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q. C. M, P. 



SO that you are remitted back to the original case, wliich was your crux 

 and difliculty in tlie matter. 



But I must notice tliese cases. The first is on the top of page 17G of 

 tije argumeut: 



Suppose that some method of explosive destruction should he discovered hy which 

 vessels on the seas adjacent to the Newfoundland coast outside of the .jurisdictional 

 line could, with profit to tliemselves, destroy all the fish that resort to those coasts, 

 and 80 put an end to the whole fishing industry upon which their inhahitants so 

 largely depend. Wouhl this he a husiness that would he held justifiahle as a part of 

 the freedom of the sea? Although the fish are admitted to he purely ferce natural, 

 and the general right of fishing in the open seas outside of certain limits is not denied. 



Well, I would first ask: Is tliere any analogy between that case and 

 the case we are discussing, if that can be called the exercise of the right 

 of fishing at all? As I read the case, I fail to see where the profit 

 comes in, because he says: " Could, with profit to themselves, destroy 

 all the fish ". 



Mr. Phelps. — Yes. 



Sir Charles Eussell. — And gather them — perhaps that is under- 

 stood? 



Mr. Phelps. — Certainly. 



Sir Charles Eussell. — " Destroy all the fish and gather them ". I 

 have, in the first instance, to say that it is a little extravagant to com- 

 pare that which is not a known or recognized form of fishing with the 

 pursuit of seals pelagically, which is the oldest form of the pursuit of 

 seals known in the history of the pursuit itself. 



Next, I say — (I think Senator Morgan was good enough to put a 

 question to me the other day on the subject) — if in truth the case were 

 that such wholesale destruction were resorted to for disproportionate 

 results, it would be very strong evidence indeed to go to any Tribunal 

 to determine whether that act was not itself done maliciously, and with 

 the intent to injure those who had the common right of fishing. 



Now the next case that is put is this: 



An Atlantic cahle has heen laid between America and Great Britain, the operation 

 of which is important to those countries and to the world. Suppose some method 

 of deep-sea fishing or marine exploration should he invented, profitahle to those 

 engaged in it, but which should interrupt the operation of the cable and jjerhaps 

 endanger its existence. Would those nations be powerless to defend themselves 

 against such consequences, because the act is jierpetrated upon the high sea? 



Well, one would require to know the circumstances intended to be 

 contemplated by that paragraph. For instance: Was the injury to the 

 cable done accidentally in the lawful pursuit of a known mode 

 1123 of fishing, because, if so done, I should say there was no remedy, 

 and no cause of complaint. If it were done gratuitously and 

 maliciously, I should have thought there was. I am not now troubling 

 myself with the question of jurisdiction or the particular Court in 

 which the cause of action might be tried — I am speaking of it on broad 

 and general principles, assuming no question of venue, or of technical 

 difficulty, to arise. But in truth all this matter (because of the uncer- 

 tainty of what the rights would be juridically considered in relation to 

 such a matter) has been already dealt with, with the co-operative assent 

 of, I may say, all the civilized Powers in the World. I x^roceed to shew 

 how it has been dealt with. 



By the Treaty of the 14th March 1884, — I will mention presently 

 what nations are parties to it — wilful and negligent interruptions of 

 telegraphic communication are made punishable without prejudice to 

 civil action (Art. 2) ; offenders are to be tried in the Courts of the coun- 

 try of their own ship or nation (Art. 8) ; and when there is reason to 



