ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR CHARLES RUSSELL, Q C. M. P. 371 

 Aud agaiu Baron Parke, in Jeffreys v. Boosey, said : 



The Legislature has no power over any person except its own subjects, that is, 

 persons natural-born subjects, or resident, or whilst they are within the limits of 

 the kingdom; the Legislature can impose no duties except ou them, aud when legis- 

 latiug for the benefit of pertjons must 2}nma facie be considered to ruean the benefits 

 of those who owe obedience to our laws, and whose interest the Legislature is under 

 a correlative obligation to protect. 



There is a remarkable illustration of this in the case referred to of 

 ex parte Blaiu, re Sawers: 



The question arose as to the application of the English Bankruptcy Law to 

 foreigners in England; the definitions of acts of bankruptcy in the Statute include 

 the commission of certain acts " in England or elsewhere;" yet it was held by the 

 Court of Appeal that a foreigner in England, although on general principles he was 

 subject to English law, could not be made bankrupt unless he had committed an act 

 of bankruptcy in England. The words " or elsewhere " were held not to apply to 

 such a foreigner on the principles above stated. 



I have already referred to the case of Queen v. Keyn, and I will not 

 repeat the reference to that case. 



The next principle adverted to is that the Colonies have no 

 11G5 power of extra-territorial legislation for foreigners. That prin- 

 ciple follows from the one which I enunciated early this morn- 

 ing, namely that these colonial Legislatures are acting under a dele- 

 gated authority, an autliority delegated to them by the Imperial Par- 

 liament and that tliey have no power to bind any one outside their own 

 territory. A very remarliable illustration of that is mentioned at page 

 58 in the case of Maclcod v. Attorney General for Neio South Wales, 

 which arose in this way. The charge was that Macleod had committed 

 bigamy. The local statute enacted that: 



Whosoever being married marries another person during the life of the former 

 husband or wife, wheresoever such second marriage takes places, shall be liable to 

 penal servitude for seven years. 



Here were general words similar to the words <' any i^erson ", so much 

 relied on by the United States. 



The Judicial Committee nevertheless rejected their general appli- 

 cation. They said : 



The colony can have no such jurisdiction, and their Lordships do not desire to 

 attribute to the Colonial Legislature an efixirt to enlarge their jurisdiction to such an 

 extent as would be inconsistent with the powers comiiiitted to a colony, and indeed 

 inconsistent with the most ftxmiliar principles of international law. . . . 



The words " whosoever being married" mean whosoever being married aud who is 

 amenable at the time of the offence committed to the jurisdiction of the colony .... 



"Wheresoever" may be read, "Wheresoever in this colony the offence is com- 

 mitted." 



So that although the words of the statute were ''whosoever being 

 married" — without any limitation of place — "marries another person 

 during the life of the former husband or wife, wheresoever such second 

 marriage takes place, shall be liable to penal servitude for seven 

 years" — where the tirst marriage had taken place inside the colony, 

 and the second marriage outside it, it was held that the man could not 

 be convicted under the terms of that section for bigamy. 



The case is reported in the "Appeal Cases" of the Law Eeports for 

 1891, at page 445. I have the case before me and it is at the disposition 

 of any of the tribunal who desire to read it. The considered judgment 

 of the Court was delivered by the late Lord Chancellor. On page 458, 

 he says: 



The result as it appears to their Lordships must be that there was no jurisdiction to 

 try the alleged offender for this offence, and that this conviction should te set aside. 



