ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR RICHARD WEBSTER, Q. C. M. P. 425 



tlie language of the Ukase; and I Deed not read it again. I may have 

 to refer to it perhaps in another connection. Now I ask the kind atten- 

 tion of the Tribnnal to a point made by my learned friend Mr. Carter, 

 which, if I may be permitted to say so as an advocate, certainly was 

 somewhat surprising. He said Eussia never attempted to claim any 

 exclusive jurisdiction in any part of Behring Sea: that it was not a 

 claim to exclusive jurisdiction; and Mr. Carter supported his statement 

 by printed passages in the Argument. I can give the references in case 

 they be required. 



Says Mr. Carter, it was not a claim to exclusive jurisdiction; and 

 here again I speak with care. For the first time, for the purposes of 

 tliis argument, it is suggested that the claim to exclude the ships of 

 all nations 100 miles from the coast is not a claim to exclusive jurisdic- 

 tion and exclusive dominion. I confess, so far as advocates are allowed 

 to have feelings, that a feeling of surprise did come across me. It 

 occurred to me that this proposition required some authority: that 

 excluding vessels from 100 miles from the coast was not an assertion of 

 exclusive dominion and an exercise of exclusive jurisdiction. 



I desire to say here with reference to an observation made by Mr. 

 Jnstice Harlan more than once to my learned friend, the Attorney- 

 General, that I do not think that Eussia had any intention of closing 

 Behring Sea. I do not think that Eussia at that time knew anything 

 about, the actual width of the passes. I do not suppose the passes 

 had been surveyed. They may have had sufficient knowledge to know 

 that they might have closed it, or they might have not. That they 

 claimed that this part of the world had all the characteristics which 

 would have justified them in closing the whole area, there is no doubtj 

 but I am disposed to adopt, if I may say so, the view put forward by 

 Mr. Justice Harlan, that whatever they meant by their hundred miles, 

 they did not have it in their mind that thereby no ship would be able 

 to go into the middle of Behring Sea; bnt if once that be recognized, 

 it strengthens my position enormously. For on what authority of text- 

 book, judicial writer, or judgment, can my friend suggest that exclud- 

 ing ships, excluding navigation, from a given belt from your coasts is 

 not making them, even something more than territorial waters, for it is 

 an exercise of dominion. Why, Sir, may I remind this Court, every 

 member of which, I know, is acquainted with the fact, that it has been 

 a subject of discussion whether even within the three-mile limit there 

 is not a right of navigation for peaceful purposes. I know Mr. Juctice 

 Harlan was good enough to read through, or look through, the judg- 

 ments in Queen v. Keyn. There is a very considerable discussion in 

 many of the judgments in Queen v. Keyn as to whether in territorial 

 waters, that is to say in waters in which, for certain purposes, undoubt- 

 edly the country had exclusive jurisdiction and exclusive dominion, 

 whether the right of j)eaceful passage was not still an international 

 right. I believe I am not going too far in saying that all the Judges 

 took that view ; and yet in the face of that discussion, counsel are found 

 to say that the claim to exclude ships from 100 miles of the coast is not 

 an attempt to exercise over those 100 miles sovereign jurisdiction. 



I have looked at several books, and I might really occupy as many 

 hours as 1 wish to occupy minutes, in citing authorities to show that 

 the origin of all this idea of exclusion was an extension of dominion 

 over territorial waters, land-locked seas, and a variety of arguments 

 that have been brought forward to give exclusive dominion ; but I will 

 content myself with reading from Chancellor Kent. I ask the Tribunal 

 to listen to what Chancellor Kent said of this claim of Eussia, which is 



