496 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR RICHARD WEBSTER, Q. C. M. P. 



French law as ii) the law of all other civilized countries that I know of, 

 it is merely a right to kill, and the right to property in them never 

 arises until possession is taken by killing. Sir, I ninst not speak with 

 too great confidence of the laws of other countries; but of course it is 

 only for the purpose of analogy that they are of service or of interest 

 to this Tribunal. But perhaps I may be allowed to say that I am not 

 aware of the law of any country, in which the law has been reduced 

 either to a code or is in such an advanced condition that it can be sum- 

 marized by text writers, or be referred to or appear in reported cases, 

 that gives at the present time the property in wild animals simply by 

 virtue of the possession of the soil on which they happen to be found. 

 And I cannot help thinking that it was a little bold of my learned friend 

 Mr. Coudertto start with the suggestion that he gave us credit for the 

 admission that we should concede that seals upon the Pribilof Islands, 

 in the territorial waters of the Pribilof Islands, and under the flag of 

 the United States, whatever that may mean — that on the territory and 

 in those waters we should concede that they were the property of the 

 United States just as much as the book which he held in his hand was 

 his property. 



Sir, there is no distinction for this purpose, for the purpose of the 

 principles that we are applying, between nations and individuals. I 

 ought perhaps to say that my learned friends Mr. Carter and Mr. 

 Phelps, and I think Mr. Coudert too, did not suggest that there was 

 any distinction. They say actually in writing, at page 44 of the United 

 States Argument, that the principles of municipal law may be invoked 

 for the purpose of considering this right of property, and Mr. Carter 

 said, that from the pointof view in which he was considering this ques- 

 tion of property, it was the same between nations as between indi- 

 viduals. It could scarcely be contradicted, because the Government 

 of the United States must be taken to be an individual for this pur- 

 pose. If the property were allowed in the Government, the nation 

 would be itself an aggregation of individuals. So in the same way the 

 various subjects of Great Britain would be able to claim property upon 

 this principle as between one another. It is put very pointedly indeed 

 at page 44 in the following passage. 



And the municipal jurisprudence of all nations proceeding upon the law of nature, 

 is everywhere in substantial accord upon the question what things are the subject 

 of property. 



Therefore it is not in anyway misrepresenting the position of my 

 learned friend Mr. Phelps if I indicate that they do not base their case 

 upon any different principles, as applicable to nations, from those which 

 they would apply in the case of individuals. 



Now, Mr. President, what is the law as between individuals'? Is it 

 the law that the presence on a piece of land of a wild animal gives the 

 property to the owner of the landwhile it is there? Sir Charles Russell 

 read from the United States authorities; and I am in this position, that 

 unless my leained friend Mr. Phelps was right in saying that one Amer- 

 ican Judge (I think he was Mr. Justice Nelson) in one case where he 

 was dealing with bees, thought that the presence of the bees in the 

 tree — not hived, but iu the tree — would give the owner of the tree 

 the property in the bees: unless that Judge did in fact express that 

 opinion, there is not a single authority for my learned friend's conten- 

 tion — not a single one. I suggested at the time to my learned friend 

 the Attorney General, — and Mr. Carter for the moment expressed accord 

 with the view that we were suggesting — that the learned Judge did 



