502 ORAL AEGUMENT OF SIR RICHARD WEBSTER, Q. C M. P. 



action of Cbosliiu wliicli the Government of Japan was not able to 

 restrain; and the action referred to by the learned Senator this morn- 

 ing, was tbe action taken by Great Britain to enforce their Treaty 

 rights which existed by the convention of 1855. If the learned Sena- 

 tor tells me that the United States had not got similar Treaty rights, 

 of coarse the argument would not apply; but I rather think it will be 

 found, when the history is looked up, that they also had Treaty right. 



Senatop Morgan. — We only had the privileges, I think, of the most 

 favored nations. 



Sir Richard Webster. — That would answer it at once. One knows 

 what the expression "favored nation", means, — that would give them, 

 at once the same rights. But at this page 1145 the history of it is 

 referred to. It will be found that the action was taken in 1801, pursu- 

 ant to a Memorandum which I will read. 



Memorandum delivered by the representatives of Great Britain, France, the 

 United States, and the Netherlands, in Japan relative to the coercive measures to be 

 adopted against the Prince of Chioshiu in the Straits of Shimonoseki, and elsewhere. 



So that the state of things is this — not that Great Britain was in 

 any way assuming to take any action against what I may call the de 

 facto and proper Government of Japan, but that they found that their 

 Treaty rights were being infringed by the action of a prince who was 

 practically rebelling against the Government of Japan, and, thereupon 

 they said to the Government of Japan : If you cannot put down this 

 rebellious chief, we will help you to do it. 



And the recitals which I have in the memorandum before me are 

 distinct. The first paragraph is this : 



When the Treaty Powers in 1862 consented, on the representations of the Tycoon's 

 Envoys, to certain important modifications in the treaties; the spirit, the motives 

 and the extent of these concessions were clearly set forth. 



In consenting to the deferred opening of the ports, mentioned in the memorandum 

 signed at the time, the Treaty Powers were careful to establish the fact that this 

 postponement, far from signifying a virtual abandonment of their rights, was, on 

 the contrary, to be taken as indicating their firm resolution to maintain them, by 

 furnishing the Tycoon with the means which he declared to be necessary for secur- 

 ing them in a more effectual manner. 



In a word, the Japanese Government by the very teuor of those representations, 

 pledged itself to remove, in exchange for these temporary coiicessions, all the diffi- 

 culties of the time, and the obstacles which might oppose the development of our 

 relations. 



But what have been the results of these promises and concessions? 



The undersigned summed them up, when, last year in the month of July, they 

 addressed to the Tycoon an identical note describing the restrictions placed upon 

 commerce, the murderous assaults committed upon foreigners, the closing of the 

 Inland Sea, and the attacks made upon foreign vessels by a Daimio : 



That was the Prince of Choshiu, who was one of the Daimios, who 

 had been attacking foreign vessels. The memorandum then proceeds. 



The Tycoon, by treating with foreigners on a footing of equality, has hurt the 

 national pride of the Daimios, while he has damaged their interests by reserving to 

 himself the monopoly of the new commercial relations. 



It then sets out the statement that a certain number of these Daimios 

 had rebelled against the authority of the Government of Japan, taking, 

 as the cause of their complaint, these Treaty arrangements which had 

 been made by the Government with the various Powers which were 

 thought to be inconsistent with the national dignity. I now read from 

 page 1147: 



The political situation of Japan might therefore be summed up as follows: 

 W^eakness of the Tycoon and increasing powerlessness of that Prince to resist the 



violent pressure of a hostile majority. 

 Existence of a party favorable to continued relations with foreigners, btit at this 



moment incapable of giving effect to its opinions. 



