ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR RICHARD WEBSTER, Q. C. M. P. 535 



fer(z naUirce unless reclaimed; and tlie books of authority, — I liave 

 investigated tliis matter, I may say, witli as much care as I could bestow 

 upon it, — repeat more than once that there are various authorities show- 

 ing that, if a man drive a stag out of the forest, then he would be liable 

 for having, interfered with the King's forest; but if the stag comes out 

 of the forest upon his own land or territory, he has a right to kill it. 



Again, stating it as I have said more than once, referring to the 

 authority of a case in the 11th Coke's Eeport, the Case of Monoiiolies, 

 at page 87, everyone on his own land may use them, that is hunting 

 and hawking, at his pleasure, without any restraint to be made unless 

 by Parliament, as appears by certain Statutes that are there cited. I, 

 therefore in deference to a view expressed by a member of the Tribunal, 

 have to state respectfully before this Tribunal, and in that I shall be 

 corrected by those skilled in English Law whom I address, that for 

 years it has been the recognized law of Great Britain, certainly for a 

 century or more, that the King has no greater property in game other 

 than the royal birds, such as swans, and the royal fish, such as sturgeon, 

 than a subject has in respect of game upon his own land. 



Now, Mr. President, I wish to say a word about the theory that, apart 

 from property, the United States have equally a right of interfering to 

 protect their industry. Sir, when my learned friend, the Attorney 

 General was addressing you upon this matter, you pointed out to him 

 that the argument of my learned friend, Mr. Phelps, and the passage 

 from the Argument which he read, was only an argument based ujjon 

 the assumption that there was no proj)erty in the seals. It is to that 

 part of the Case that the observations which I shall now address to the 

 Court are directed. It is extremely important that I should enforce 

 upon the Tribunal this view, namely, that my learned friend, Mr. Car- 

 ter in his oral argument, Mr. Phelps, in his argument to which he has 

 already told you he adheres, and to which he courteously called our 

 attention, and said that we must deal with it by anticipation, both 

 those learned gentlemen assert that their right to protect — to take the 

 steps which they did take in connexion with the British vessels, is inde- 

 pendent of any j^ossession, property, or ownership of the seals them- 

 selves. At page 136 of the written argument of my learned friend, Mr. 

 Phelps, you will find this passage which I have no doubt is in your 

 memory, but I will read it again. 



The case of the United States has thus far proceeded upon the ground of a national 

 property in the seal herd itself. Let it now be assumed, for the purposes of the argu- 

 ment, that no such right of property is to be admitted, and that the seals are to be 

 regarded, outside of territorial waters, as /era; naturce in the full sense of that term. 

 Let them be likened, if that be possible, to the fish whose birthplace and home are 

 in the open sea, and which only approach the shores for the purpose of food at cer- 

 tain seasons, in such numbers as to render the fishing there productive. 



The question then remains, whether upon that hypothesis, the industry established 

 and maintained by the United States Government on the Pribilof Islands, in the tak- 

 ing of the seals and the commerce that is based upon it, are open to be destroyed at 

 the pleasure of citizens of Canada, by a method of pursuit outside the ordinary line 

 of territorial jurisdiction, which must result in the extermination of the animals. 



And at page 484 of Mr. Carter's speech, he in opening his argument 

 on this part of the Case, said : 



I come now then to the other branch of the question of property namely, the prop- 

 erty which the United States asserted in the industry carried on by them on the 

 Pribilof Islands, irrespective of the question whether they have property in the 

 seals or not. 



Therefore, for the purpose of that to which I desire to direct the 

 attention of the Tribunal, I am entitled to assume — nay, I must make 

 the assumption made by my learned friends that no property exists, and 



