572 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 



Intoly necessary that it slionkl be discussed, and for very obvious rea- 

 sons. I do nottliink it is too much to say that Arbitrations as a means for 

 tbo settlement of International disputes maybe said to be yet upon their 

 trial. Tliere are very many who believe — all right minded men most 

 earnestly hope — that to an increasing extent they may become the sub- 

 stitute for the only means, so terrible in its consequences, which can be 

 made available in their place ; but if they are to do this they must justify 

 themselves by their works. There are many people I believe now watch- 

 ing this Arbitration most anxiously, who know very little of the merits 

 of the case, and who care absolutely nothing for the success or failure 

 of either of the contending parties; but they watch it in the hope that 

 it will show to the World, and the two nations that are engaged in it, 

 that if Nations do not obtain certainly by these means all that they might 

 possiblyhave obtained by the test of war — by the test of might — they are 

 at least certain to secure all that they can shew themselves entitled to 

 by the far preferable and more reasonable test of right. It was neces- 

 sary therefore, and essential, that every principle involved in this case, 

 every consideration which either side might think it worth whileto bring 

 to the attention of the Tribunal, should be carefully and anxiously 

 examined — every principle which is thought applicable tested, and 

 traced to its source — and every argument great or small which could 

 have any bearing on the case should be most anxiously weighed. But, 

 while this is the case, there is as it appears to me one feature peculiar to 

 this Arbitration considered in its International aspect. Most Interna- 

 tional Arbitrations, so far as I am aware, have been concerned with the 

 exercise of belligerent rights, or with the question of territorial or mari- 

 time boundaries, which could only be determined by the principles of 

 International law; but it so happens that the most important questions 

 in this case — those upon which in substance it must ultimately turn — 

 might have arisen between individuals, and might have come up for 

 decision in any ordinary Court in either of the countries interested. 



It is possible of course to conceive (though I think it very difficult), that 

 the decision as between individuals might be different from that which 

 it should be as between nations. I say this, because I know that is indi- 

 cated in some portions of the argument on the other side, but still I think 

 this is hardly a possible conception ; and what I propose to do, therefore, 

 as the only course which it seems to me can avoid prolixity, and may at 

 the same time be of some possible use, is to assume that this case has come 

 up (as it might come up), by one individual against another, to be deter- 

 mined by the ordinary courts of either of the countries interested, and 

 endeavour to point out whatconsiderations it would then have presented, 

 and upon what grounds the case would have been disposed of. 



Sui)pose for example it had been a claim, as it might well have been 

 if these islands had been owned by a private individual — suppose it had 

 been a claim by one of the ownersof these islandsagaiiista pelagic sealer, 

 for the destruction of a quantity of seals from the islands — you may say 

 1,000 dollars worth or 10,000 dollars worth; it is immaterial — and that 

 it had come up for disposition in oneof the ordinary courts of either coun- 

 try, in what shape would it have then presented itself to the judge, and 

 in what way, or upon what grounds, would it probably have been dis- 

 posed of? Now, I apprehend, the first thing that would have struck any- 

 one in such a case would have been the absolute novelty of the claim, 

 which at this stage of the world's history is certainly a consideration 

 entitled to some weight. I think it would occur to any judge before 

 "whom it was brought to say: 



