ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 573 



If there is one i)rinciple better established than another, it is the free- 

 dom of the seas to all tlie world — the equality of all nations upon the 

 high seas, and the ri<;ht of all people to take whatever they may find 

 there in the shape of free swimming fish or animals, as they may be able 

 to secure them. I think it would be asked : how do seals form an excep- 

 tion to the universal rule ? And with regard to seals themselves it w^ould 

 be very properly observed : The seals have been swimming the ocean — 

 both the great oceans of the world, the Pacific and the Atlantic — and 

 they have been the subject of pursuit by man, since long before the mem- 

 ory of man. Has there ever been up to this time a claim made by any 

 nation or by any individual to property in those animals'^ That clearly 

 must have been answered in the negative; and if the question were tested 

 further, I think theex|)lanation would have been asked : have you con- 

 sidered the analogy between all other animals of the same kind and of 

 the same nature — animals/'erre natiirw, as we may suppose these seals to 

 be for the moment. I think the case would have been put of pheasants 

 and rabbits and innumerable other wild animals, as to the law of which 

 there is no question whatever, and the Plaintift's would have been asked 

 to distinguish between the claim made in this ^ase, and a claim prepertes 

 in seals animals and birds. I question myself whether the case would 

 have gone further. Whether it would have gone further or not, how- 

 ever I venture to submit that the onus would have been on the claim- 

 ant — that is to say, I think it would have been said to him: You must 

 distinguish this case from the general right as regards the high-seas, 

 and from the universal law prevailing as to animals ferm naturw. 

 This has been attempted here and I therefore proceed to examine, as 

 shortly as I can, the grounds which are taken here, and which would 

 have been advanced m a case of that description in supy)ort of the 

 claim. 



Now there is some dififtculty — at least I have found some difficulty — 

 in ascertaining exactly on what ground that claim is put; but first it 

 may be well to say a word upon a question which would probably I 

 think, in a contest of that description, either have assumed no place at 

 all, or would at least have assumed a place even more unimportant than 

 it has now been relegated to by the present contention of our friends. 

 I am speaking now of what may be called the derivative title from 

 Russia, and I think that may be put in a very few words indeed, as 

 I shoukl put it, viewing the Case as I am now endeavouring to con- 

 sider it. 



I do not desire to go into the Ukase of 1799, or to treat this question 

 otherwise than in a very cursory manner; but if the question of the 

 derivative rights of Russia and the Ukase of 1821 had come up lor 

 consideration, this much at all events would have been plain — that 

 that Ukase was the cause of the Treaties of 1824 and 1825, and those 

 Treaties were the result of that Ukase. 



Now the assertion on the part of the United States is, that in those 

 Treaties the phrase "Pacific Ocean" does not include Behring Sea, 

 and that the term "north west coast" — (without going into details, or 

 without speaking of the different meanings given to it) practically 

 means the north-west coast south of the Alaskan Peninsula. 



Let us look at the two or three documents upon which this substan- 

 tially depends. 



In the first place, there can be no question as to what the Ukase 

 itself says, or as to its meaning. We should have to ascertain I think — 

 we should have to ask ourselves — upon this question: What was it 

 that the Ukase claimed : What was it that Russia asserted that they 



