ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 585 



the natives is an act done as to the coasts, not with reference to the 

 sea. 



Senator Morgan. — What reason could Eussia have had for pro- 

 hibiting it? 



Mr. Robinson. — She wished to keep the trade of the country, I 

 suppose. 



Senator Morgan. — What trade, — the fur trade? 



Mr. Robinson. — I cannot say, — every kind of trade. 



Senator Morgan. — They had not any other that 1 know of. 



Mr. Robinson. — No; furs would be the only thing they could got 

 from tlie natives, but then they would take other things to the natives, 

 and I take it the trade was in supplying things to the natives and 

 getting in exchange furs. That is carried on on the coast, and bus 

 nothing to do with maritime jurisdiction. 



Senator Morgan. — That would depend on how it was carried on. 

 Suppose it was in canoes? 



Mr. Robinson. — 1 do not think that that would make the least dif- 

 ference, because canoes must land. It is true that I may trade in a 

 canoe; but then I must land, and I do not think, if the natives should 

 come out within the three-mile limit in a canoe, it would make any 

 difference, because it would be within the territorial jurisdiction. 



Senator Morgan. — The general idea was that Russia asserted that 

 they were ijiterested in the protection of the fur-bearing animals. 



Mr. Robinson. — Not that I know of especially. On paper she 

 asserted unquestionably jurisdiction; but I do not talk about what 

 she asserted, because she asserted it for a short time, and then with- 

 drew it. If she did not, I am wrong; but, as a matter of fact, the 

 rights she exercised were in no sense whatever exclusive as to Behring 

 Sea, and I do not know any instance which puts an end to that argu- 

 ment more thoroughly and emphatically than the fact that she was 

 asked to stop whaling in Behring Sea, and said she could not do it, — 

 it would be contrary to her Treaties of 1824 and 1825. I have done 

 with that, and I am sorry I omitted it in dealing with the first four 

 points. I only call attention to it to show that the doctrine of acqui- 

 escence has no application whatever. It may be admitted that if she 

 had done anything which would have implied a prohibition of i^elagic 

 sealing, if it had existed and she had known of it, it would have been 

 open to the United States to contend that she would have prevented it. 



Now, I was proceeding to consider the claim of property made on 

 the part of the United States and the grounds on which they put it; 

 and I have said I find a difficulty in ascertaining with satisfaction to 

 myself whether they put their claim on municipal law or on inter- 

 national law, or on both. They have a right to put it on either or on 

 any law, and in the alternative; and perhaps, therefore, it is better to 

 discuss it without distinction. When I find, for example, that they 

 refer to Blackstone for their propositions as they do, they are there of 

 course claiming under municipal law; that is to say, they cite along 

 passage from Blackstone at page 44, and they say under that they 

 have a right per industriam. That is a claim, of course, by municipal 

 law. So I understand my learned friend Mr. Phelps' Argument at 

 page 132, where he first says that under the principles of municipal 

 law they would have a property, but, on the broader principles of 

 international law their right is still more clear. There they claim it 

 on both. They say in effect, "We have the right, in all these aspects, 

 in the seal herd or in the industry"; and we have it under municipal 

 law or international law, or both. 



